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“All perceiving is also thinking, all reasoning is also intuition, all observation is also invention.”  
(Rudolf Arnheim) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Decision-making is a vital part of our lives. What are the right decisions for attaining my goals? 
How can I draw the correct conclusion in a world full of uncertainty, with incomplete 
information and limited cognitive skills?  
For decades, human beings were regarded as complete rational decision makers, prescribed to 
behave to the norms and axioms as postulated by mathematics and economics. However, for 
making decisions in consistence with these models humans lack the knowledge and information 
as well as the required computational capacities – as coined by Herbert Simon, their rationality is 
bounded. Instead, judgmental evaluations and choices are made by the use of cognitive heuristics, 
colloquially called ‘mental short-cuts’. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine how these cognitive heuristics – divided into judgmental 
and choice heuristics – influence the individual’s decision process, as well as to study their impact 
on the interpersonal negotiation situation.  
 
Chapter 2 illuminates the nature of human decision behavior: According to the dual-process 
theories of reasoning, cognition can be split into the outcome-oriented associative System 1 
(intuition) and the process-oriented deliberate System 2 (reflection). Both systems work in an 
interactive way, where System 2 is ascribed the monitoring role. The opening chapter touches 
upon the selective perception and processing of information, defines choice and problem solving 
and explains how judgments are embedded within the task environment and a person’s schema. 
It furthermore gives an overview of decision analysis – the prescriptive approach to rational 
decision making.    
Chapter 3 continues with the notion of rational decision making, presenting two different models 
of rationality:  On the one hand, the classical homo œconomicus view that submits decision 
makers to the norms of expected utility theory and probability theory, and on the other hand 
Herbert Simon’s concept of bounded rationality that emphasizes the necessity of a successful fit 
between the environment and human’s limited cognitive abilities.  
Chapter 4 immerses into the matter by giving an introductory example of a cognitive heuristic, 
showing that mental activity consists of ‘simplifying’ the judgmental situation: In a world full of 
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ambiguity, human beings have to make intelligent inferences from the environmental structures 
given (‘intelligent context-sensitive reasoning’). 
Chapter 5 studies the program of research on judgment under uncertainty as introduced by 
Tversky and Kahneman in the 1970ies, which became known as the ‘Heuristics and Biases 
Program’. This approach covers judgmental heuristics; Tversky and Kahneman regard processes 
of intuitive judgment not as simplifications of the rational models, but as different in kind. The 
main heuristics of their program comprise representativeness, availability, and anchoring and 
adjustment, later being enlarged by the affect heuristic. The chapter closes with the main critique 
on the program, in the first instance by Gerd Gigerenzer, director of the Center for Adaptive 
Behavior and Cognition (ABC) at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin.  
Whereas the previous chapter deals with judgmental heuristics (based on impressions that arise 
automatically), Chapter 6 deals with choice heuristics – conscious strategies, intentionally 
designed to simplify choice and to save mental effort. The ‘fast and frugal’ heuristics of the ABC 
research group present choice or system 2 heuristics for the most part as they are intentionally 
chosen in order to reduce computational burden. They are contained in an adaptive toolbox, 
which the human mind draws on for making decisions under uncertainty; fast and frugal 
heuristics can be split into the following classes: ignorance-based decision making, one-reason 
decision making and elimination heuristics. The focus of the program lies on one-reason decision 
making (in particular on the Take the Best heuristic), which bases decision on a single cue. The 
chapter also illuminates critical factors that are likely to foster the use of simple heuristics as well 
as the influence of emotions and social context, and concludes with critique on ABC’s Heuristics. 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 turn from the intrapersonal decision situation to the interpersonal 
negotiation situation. The main characteristics of negotiations and the concept of negotiation 
analysis are defined; an overview of judgmental heuristics in negotiations and their impact on the 
perception of negotiations is given: Judgmental heuristics in negotiations include, inter alia, 
framing, the mythical fixed-pie and the irrational escalation of commitment.  
The last chapter concludes with a critical review of ABC’s heuristics, compared to the Heuristics 
and Biases Program and their suitability for negotiations.  
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2. The Nature of  Human Decision Behavior 
2.1 The Architecture of Cognition 
 
Cognitive processes can be divided into two main families, being labeled System 1 (Intuition) 
and System 2 (Reasoning)1. Reasoning is at work when we, for example, fill out an income 
statement; intuition takes place when we feel repulsed by the image of a gigantic flea, depicting a 
flea market’s advertisement (Rozin/Nemeroff 2002, in: Kahneman 2003: 1450). Reasoning is 
deliberately controlled and effortful, goes on in a sequential manner and is slower than System 1, 
intuition, which is characterized by rapidity, automatic processes, effortlessness and emotions. 
The characteristics of intuition are governed by habit2 and are therefore difficult to control or 
modify, whereas the characteristics of reasoning are relatively flexible and submitted to rules. 
Whether a task is processed more by System 1 or by System 2, is to a certain extent a question of 
effort needed, since overall capacity for mental effort is limited (Kahneman 2003: 1450ff).  
 
Intuitive operations produce impressions of perception and thought, which arise voluntary and 
need not be expressed in words. Judgments, on the other side, are characterized by their intended 
and explicit nature; consequently, System 2 is involved in all judgments, no matter if they are 
generated by impressions or by deliberate reasoning. However, whether people’s judgments and 
actions and ensuing errors are corrected depends on the monitoring function of System 2 
(Kahneman 2003: 1452; 1467). 
According to Kahneman (2003:1469), the central characteristic of agents is not that they reason 
weakly but that their actions are often intuitive (therefore, the term ‘reasoning error’ in this 
context is misleading).  
 
The main characteristics of the 2-systems-approach can be summarized in the following table: 
 
 
 
 
                                            
1 These labels were proposed by Stanovich and West (2000): Individual Differences in Reasoning. Implications for 
the Rationality Debate?, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 23, pp. 645-726. They also list terms for the systems as 
used by a variety of researchers, and the properties of dual-process theories of reasoning (p. 659). 
2 In decision making habits – old behaviors that are used in new but similar situations – are called policies (see 
Beach/Connolly 20052:32). 
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System 1 (Intuitive) System 2 (Reflective) 
Process Characteristics  
Automatic 
Effortless 
Associative 
Rapid, parallel 
Process opaque 
Skilled Action 
Controlled 
Effortful 
Deductive 
Slow, serial 
Self-aware 
Rule application 
Content on Which Processes Act  
Affective 
Causal propensities 
Concrete, specific 
Prototypes 
Neutral 
Statistics 
Abstract 
Set 
 
Fig 1: Two Cognitive Systems (see Kahneman/Frederick 2002). 
 
 
2.2 Problem Solving, Choice and Judgment 
 
Eysenck (20042: 315f) suggests that the key aspects to problem solving are the following: goal 
orientation, the use of cognitive processes (System 2) rather than automatic processes (System 1), 
with the instant solution being not at hand due to the lack of relevant information. He 
furthermore makes a distinction between well-defined and ill-defined problems: Well-defined problems 
show clearly specified situations, a range of possible moves and a goal or solution. The main 
focus of laboratory studies or psychological experiments lies on well-defined problems as it is 
easier that way to detect the blunders in the human problem solver’s strategies.  In our everyday 
lives, however, we are confronted with ill-defined problems most of the time.  
 
Choice can in most cases be regarded as the end product of a process of conflict resolution. 
People make choices in order to satisfy needs which become expressed as goals. One definition 
of goals could be Simon’s (1955) aspiration level: The decision maker fixes a level which he finds 
acceptable. If this level is reached, search will stop. Examples of potentially conflicting processing 
goals (i.e. meta-goals within the decision process) could be the maximization of accuracy and the 
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easiness of justification of the decision to others, and the minimization of cognitive effort and 
negative decision-related affect (Payne/Bettman 2001: 125).  
Engagement in action is necessary to achieve a certain goal.  – Before doing so, one first has to 
engage in mental effort of analyzing the problem which leads to conflict; cognitive commitment 
clarifies goals and preferences. If the individual chooses to reject the potential conflict he can 
pursue the no-choice option to preserve the status quo. Keeping the status quo has the 
advantages of bearing less uncertainty and less responsibility than with conscious choice (Corbin 
1980)3. Habitual choice, on the other hand, occurs when the problem solver wants to avoid 
conscious thought in choice as he is relying on habits required through past experiences. 
However, even if habitual choices were successful in the past, their success depends on a stable 
environment (Hogarth 19892: 66ff; Einhorn, Hillel J. / Hogarth, Robin M. 1981: 74). 
 
Based on the fact that the human mind is capacity limited, perception of information is not 
comprehensive but selective: The senses take in information from the environment, the mind 
performs computations on that information, which finally leads to goal-directed actions. What 
has to be taken in consideration is that the mind actively seeks information for integration within 
existing norms and thought patterns – anticipations of what people expect to see play an 
important part in what they actually see and remember (Hogarth 19892: 135; Newell/Bröder 
2008: 196).  
 
In order to think one has to process information: Information processing in human problem 
solving is assumed to be serial; people possess limited short-term memory capacities (i.e. it is only 
possible to operate on a small number of items of information at a given time), but the ability to 
retrieve important information from long-term memory. For changing the current state, they 
apply mental operators to bridge the difference between the goal state and its subgoal. Due to the 
complexity of most problems this is achieved by the use of heuristics or mental shortcuts 
(Newell/Simon 1972, in: Eysenck 20042: 322f, op. cit.).  
The conceptual model of judgment as presented by Hogarth (19892: 206ff) sees judgment taking place 
within a system of three elements: the person, the task environment within which the judgments 
are made and the actions that result from judgment: 
 
 
                                            
3 See Corbin, R. M. (1980): Decisions that might not get made, in: T. S. Wallsten (ed.): Cognitive Processes in Choice 
and Decision Behavior, Erlbaum, Hillsdale/NJ. 
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Fig 2: A Conceptual Model of Judgment (see Hogarth 19892). 
 
 
Judgments take place within the task environment; the person’s schema (or frame) – his beliefs 
about the task environment and his representation of it – is embedded within the task 
environment.  The operations that lead to judgment can be split up into acquisition of information 
(from the individual’s memory and the environment), processing of information and output. 
Normally, the output is impossible to differentiate from action for a third party.  Action leads to 
an outcome which will entail a feedback loop into the person’s schema.  
Judgments can be understood within a framework where the individual, actions and the 
environment reciprocally affect each other: The individual makes a judgment which consequently 
leads to action, action affects the environment and the environment affects the individual who 
forms new judgments (Hogarth 19892: 126). 
 
2.3 An Outlook on Decision Analysis 
Decision problems can be structured methodically by the means of decision analysis; its purpose 
is to help the decision maker improve the quality of his decisions (Hogarth 19892:177; Clemen 
1991: 9).  
According to Clemen (1991: 2f), there are four basic sources of difficulty in a decision problem: 
its complexity, the intrinsic uncertainty in the given situation, the necessity of the individual make 
Schema 
Task Environment 
Feedback 
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trade-offs (cost/benefits, i.a.) with regard to several objectives, and the outlook that different 
perspectives lead to different conclusions.  
All decisions depend on the answer to two questions: 
 
 What are the consequences if alternative actions are taken? 
 How can the uncertainties in the environment of relevance to the decision be assessed? 
 
The questions above refer to the evaluative and predictive dimensions of judgment. Personal 
judgments about uncertainty (with a subjective probability representing an individual’s degree of 
belief) and values are crucial inputs for decision analysis. The steps that are involved in decision 
analysis are in effect an elaboration of these two fundamental questions (Hogarth 19892: 177f, 
Clemen 1991: 5; 209). 
 
Key questions at the different stages of the decision approach (see figure 3) are the following 
(Hogarth 19892:178ff): 
 
1. Structuring the problem: Who is the decision maker? What are the alternatives and how 
should they be evaluated? Where do the uncertainties lie? 
2. Assessing consequences: How adequate are the measurements on which the alternatives 
should be evaluated and how should they be weighted? 
3. Assessing uncertainties: What information is of relevance to the uncertainties? 
4. Evaluating alternatives: What decision rule should be used? 
5. Sensitivity analysis: What degree of variation of the assessed consequences and 
uncertainties would change the optimal decision?  
6. Information gathering: What are the costs and benefits of obtaining more information? 
7. Choice: Which alternative maximizes expected utility? (I.e. the assessed consequences – 
utilities – are weighted by the assessed uncertainties – probabilities – and one chooses the 
alternatives for which the weighted sum is largest.) 
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Fig 3: A Simplified Flowchart of the Decision Analysis Process (see Hogarth 19892). 
 
 
Decision Analysis can, per definition, be regarded as a set of normative (or prescriptive) 
decision-theoretic models conjoint with the techniques for applying them.  Descriptive models, 
on the contrary, try to predict what people actually do. Psychological models are for the most part 
descriptive; the umbrella term behavioral decision theory comprehends the set of descriptive 
decision-theoretic models (Von Winterfeldt/Edwards 1986: 16).  
 
The idea of rationality is clearly a prescriptive one – it considers some actions to be appropriate 
and some that are not (Von Winterfeldt/Edwards 1986: 2).  
 
But what defines human beings’ choice behavior to be rational? 
1. Structuring the 
Problem 
2. Assessing 
Consequences 
3. Assessing 
Uncertainties 
4. Evaluating 
Alternatives 
5. Sensitivity 
Analysis 
6. Information 
Gathering 
7. Choice 
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3. Models of  Rationality 
3.1 Homo œconomicus 
 
According to a possibly apocryphal story, an eminent philosopher of science once encountered a noted 
decision theorist in a hallway at their university. The decision theorist was pacing up and down, 
muttering “What shall I do? What shall I do?” 
“What’s the matter, Howard?” asked the philosopher. 
Replied the decision theorist: “It’s horrible, Ernest - I’ve got an offer from Harvard and I don’t 
know whether to accept it. “ 
”Why Howard, “reacted the philosopher, “you’re one of the world’s great experts on decision 
making. Why don’t you just work out the decision tree, calculate the probabilities and expected 
outcomes, and determine which choice maximizes your expected utility?” 
With annoyance, the other replied: “Come on, Ernest. This is serious.” 
 
(Thagard/Millgram 1997) 
 
Traditionally, the study of judgment and decision making has been approached by comparing a 
judgment or decision to a standard. An evaluation is made whether some judgment or decision is 
‘good’ or ‘bad’ seen in relation to a standard or norm. Normative models offer these standards, 
because they are based on rules or axioms, such as expected utility theory (derived from economics) 
and probability theory (derived from mathematics). The homo œconomicus metaphor states that the 
complete rational decision maker behaves according to the norm (Newell/Bröder 2008: 195).  
Prescriptive theory assumes that a decision maker strives to do what is best for him, which is 
usually interpreted as deciding on the option that offers the most attractive payoff. Decision 
makers, however, do not always know about the payoffs (i.e. consequences/results) or how 
valuable they will be; most decisions’ features are, indeed, uncertainty and risk. – Therefore, 
decisions can be seen as gambles: Each option is a potential bet, characterized by its potential gains 
or losses and beyond the decision maker’s control (Beach/Connolly 20052: 49f).   
In the 18th century, Daniel Bernoulli prescribed a rational method of gambling: For each bet the 
payoff for winning should be multiplied with the probability of winning and the payoff for losing 
should be multiplied with the probability of losing. These two products should be added; a 
gambler should select the sum with the largest expected value (Beach/Connolly 20052: 50f). 
Together with Gabriel Cramer, Bernoulli sought to solve the St. Petersburg Paradox: Why would 
people only pay a small amount of money if some game renders infinite mathematical 
expectation? Bernoulli’s proposition was that people maximize expected utility rather than 
expected monetary value. Therefore, the dollar amounts should be replaced by their subjective 
worth (or utility). Bernoulli’s proposition of the utility function U(x) was logarithmic, showing 
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diminishing increases in utility for equal increases in wealth. John von Neumann and Oskar 
Morgenstern (1944) turned Bernoulli’s descriptive model into a prescriptive one – denoted4 as 
 
 
 
The model rests upon five basic assumptions or axioms – completeness, transitivity, continuity, 
monotonicity and substitution5 - that define consistent behavior with which the decision maker is 
supposed to express preferences among risky prospects (Schoemaker 1982: 530f; Clemen 1991: 
405).  
 
In the Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function probability is considered to be objectively 
given, following the view of LaPlace (1812) who defined probability “as the number of 
elementary outcomes favorable to some event divided by the total number of possible elementary 
outcomes” (in: Schoemaker 1982: 536, op. cit.). Jacques Bernoulli (1713)6, on the other hand, had 
earlier defined probability as a “degree of confidence” which may vary from decision maker to 
decision maker for a given choice situation. He considered the art of guessing to consist of 
accurate assessments of unknown probabilities, e.g. by observing objective frequencies. This view 
bears certain restrictions: Probability cannot be seen as exactly numerical; furthermore it is often 
unclear which sample space should be used. The subjective school of probability as developed 
by Savage (1954)7 et al. saw probabilities as “degree of beliefs”: For a given set of hypotheses, 
basically any subjective probability can be assigned, under the conditions ∑ pi= 1 and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.  
Normative expected utility theory seeks to improve decisions; it is supposed to overcome the 
shortcomings of unaided, intuitive decision making. Its drawbacks, however, are that people 
neither structure decision problems as holistically as expected utility theory prescribes nor do they 
process information, particularly probabilities, in accordance with the model’s rules. Intuitive 
decision making (System 1) may be so basic that it is incompatible with normative models 
(Schoemaker 1982: 536ff; 552; 554).  
 
It also gives raise to the question how flawed human reasoning is: Evans and Over (1997: 403, in: 
Eysenck 20042: 376, op. cit.) make the distinction between two types of rationality – Rationality1 
and Rationality2. People have personal rationality or Rationality1 when “they are generally 
                                            
4 Notation: pi=probability, u=utility of outcome xi, i=consequence of a given alternative. 
5 For a thorough presentation of the axioms see: Von Neumann, John / Morgenstern, Oskar (19472): Theory of 
Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton University Press, NJ. 
6 See Bernoulli, Jacques (1713): Ars Conjectandi. 
7 See Savage, Leonard J. (1954): The Foundations of Statistics, Wiley, NY. 
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successful in achieving their basic goals, to do with keeping themselves alive, finding their way in 
the world, and communicating with each other.” For Evans and Over, personal rationality 
depends on our implicit cognitive system, operating at an unconscious level (System 1). 
Impersonal rationality or Rationality2, on the other hand, is shown when “they [people] act with 
good reasons sanctioned by a normative theory such as formal logic or probability theory.” Thus, 
impersonal rationality depends on our explicit cognitive system, operating at a conscious level 
(System 2). Research tends to set its studies on how Rationality2 is susceptible to cognitive errors, 
even when Rationality1 (intuition) is not. This leads to the conclusion that rational models may be 
seen as “theories, and not standards, of behavior” (McKenzie 2003). 
 
3.2 The Concept of Bounded Rationality 
 
In 1955, Herbert Simon stated that  
 
“Traditional economic theory postulates an ‘economic man’, who, in the course of being ‘economic’ is 
also ‘rational.’[…] He is assumed also to have a well-organized and stable system of preferences, 
and a skill in computation that enables him to calculate, for the alternative courses of action that are 
available to him, which of these will permit him to reach the highest attainable point on his preference 
scale.” (p. 99)  
 
Simon, Nobel Laureate in economics, revolutionized the study of choice by contrasting 
observations of how people actually make choices and decisions with the rational (normative) 
models as postulated by economists.  – For making decisions in consistence with these models 
humans lack the knowledge and information as well as the required computational skills. He 
declared that human decision making may not be rational from an economic point of view; 
however, it is still ‘reasonable’ (Hogarth 19892: 63).  
The constraints of limited computational capacity and predictive ability have to be taken as 
givens; people construct ‘small worlds’ that present limited representations of a decision problem, 
and find techniques to solve the problem approximately (Beach/Connolly 20052: 10; Simon 1955: 
101; Simon 1990: 6).  
Simon coined the term ‘bounded rationality’, explaining human behavior to be shaped by a pair 
of scissors “whose two blades are the structure of the task environments and the computational 
capabilities of the actor” (Simon 1990: 7).  In order to describe, predict and explain the behavior 
of a system of bounded rationality, it is crucial to build a theory of the system’s processes and to 
describe the environment to which it is adapting (Simon 1990: 6f). It is necessary to look at both 
blades to make the scissors cut successfully; human behavior cannot be understood by studying 
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cognition or the environment alone. Minds with limited time, knowledge and other resources can 
be doing well in decision making by capitalizing on the structures in their environments. In 
addition to that, bounded rationality dispenses with optimization (synonymous with maximizing 
expected utility) as required by normative decision theory (Gigerenzer/Selten 2001: 4; Klein 
2001: 105). Instead of searching for the optimal solution, the decision making ‘satisfices’ – 
search is stopped when a solution meets expectations. Choosing the first satisfactory solution 
mean to pick an alternative that is regarded as ‘good enough’, i.e. when the decision maker’s 
aspiration level is met or exceeded. The concept of satisficing therefore takes into respect 
human’s computational as well as informational constraints (Simon 1990: 9f).   
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4. Cognitive Heuristics: An Approach 
4.1 An Introductory Example8  
 
Imagine the task of catching a baseball: As the ballplayer is determined to catch it, he has to be at 
the spot where the ball will land in time. But how does he proceed to reach the right spot?  One 
possible solution would be to find the ball’s initial distance and speed, and its projection angle. 
Other factors such as wind speed, air resistance or spin of the ball would have to be taken into 
consideration as well.  All the computations about the ball’s trajectory would have to be made 
within seconds – the time the ball flies. Clearly, the ball would have landed long before all the 
necessary calculations would have been finished.  
But how do players indeed know where to run? – They make use of the gaze heuristic (fig. 4). 
According to this heuristic, the player fixates the ball and starts running, adjusting running speed 
so that the angle of gaze remains constant. All the information that is of relevance is the angle of 
gaze; there is no need of taking all causally information into account, as omniscience would 
imply. The player is not able to compute where the ball will land – by proceeding heuristically and 
just using one variable (the angle of gaze), however, he will be carried to the point where the ball 
will hit the ground. Or, to put it into biologist Richard Dawkins’ (1989: 96; in: Gigerenzer 2005: 
211, op. cit.) words: “At some subconscious level9 something functionally equivalent to the 
mathematical calculation is going on.”  
 
 
Fig 4: The Gaze Heuristic (see Gigerenzer 2001a) 
                                            
8 Gigerenzer 2004: 63; Marsh/Todd/Gigerenzer 2004: 273; Gigerenzer 2005: 211. 
9 ‘Subconscious’ would refer to the use of judgmental heuristics. 
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This example wants to show that mental activity consists of ‘simplifying’ the judgmental situation.  
– Humans possess cognitive skills such that e.g. the computational ability to calculate the route of 
a ball is not required. A similar illustration – a billiard ball’s trajectory – can already be found in 
Friedman/Savage 194810 (Hogarth 19892: 230f).   
 
4.2 Context-sensitive Reasoning 
 
It is an undeniable fact that we commit mistakes. This, of course, raises the question whether 
errors are caused by the limitations of our cognitive system or whether they are a vital part of our 
intelligent system.  According to Gigerenzer (2004: 195), errors tend to be labeled as ‘good’ or 
‘bad’: A ‘good’ error’s feature is that someone is (in  the long run) better off committing the error 
than not committing it, for reaching a goal more quickly or for reaching it at all. Trial-and-error 
learning presents one basis of good errors; not trying out things and sporadically committing 
errors would lead the intelligence of the system ad absurdum.  
The second view of errors is at the opposite end: To err means not to think, or, at least, not hard 
enough; an intelligent system should better do without mistakes. The study of cognitive errors 
has been dominated by logical principles: Errors were seen as nuisances, as a gap between 
people’s behavior and an established rule of arithmetic, logic or statistics. The same way 
perceptual illusions (like seeing things that diverge from the appropriate physical measurements) 
should help to unravel the laws of perception, errors of judgment should help to discover the 
laws of higher cognition (Tversky/Kahneman 1983: 313, in: Gigerenzer: 2005, op. cit.). In this 
sense, the laws of logic and probability are regarded as the norm for good reasoning (Gigerenzer 
2005: 197ff).  
Human intelligence, however, cannot be restricted to these norms: In a world full of ambiguity, 
we have to make intelligent inferences from the environmental structures given, making an 
“uncertain yet informed bet based on cues”, resulting in “intelligent context-sensitive reasoning”. 
(Gigerenzer 2005: 204). Context can be considered to refer to both the formal structure as well as 
the content of a given task. It not only comprises task variables, but also what the decision maker 
brings to the task, like past experience gained through learning, limitations on memory or 
attention and similar traits. Cognitive processes must not be seen as givens: they develop and 
change over time due to maturation, experience and education. Prescriptive models, on the 
                                            
10 See Friedman, M./Savage, L.J. (1948): The Utility Analysis of Choice involving Risk, Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol. 56, pp. 279-304. 
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contrary, make simplifying assumptions of the environment and achieve their generality and 
power by treating problems out of context, setting their focus on structure (Einhorn/Hogarth 
1981: 56, 61; Von Winterfeldt/Ward 1986: 550).   
Intuitive predictions, as System 1 proposes, are for the most part founded on the decision 
maker’s causal understanding of the environment. – As the environment structures are too 
complex and uncertain in comparison to one’s cognitive abilities, people are prone to discover 
causal patterns. The problem hereby is that it is difficult to distinguish between pattern and 
noise: Sometimes probable cause is inferred where none exists. The nature of causal reasoning, as 
opposed to statistical reasoning which is fully based on the logical structure of information, 
responds both to content and structure (Hogarth 19892: 40).  
As humans can infer causality from the environment, they possess the ability to adapt their 
behavior, i.e. they can learn from the cause-effect between actions and outcome. This not only 
presents an ability crucial for survival, but it also facilitates causal inference and induction and 
leads to the development of categorization. Apart from being able to organize our knowledge, 
people also possess the skill to think about their own thinking (metacognition) which can be 
directly linked to one’s decision to e.g.  alter behavior in different situations. Another aspect of 
contingent learning is that it can lead to a change in tastes and preferences – as opposed to 
fixed preferences in normative models. Furthermore, a lot of judgmental and decision research 
focused on studies where all the necessary information for reaching a judgment or decision was 
provided in descriptions of the respective problem (also see Eysencks 20042 definition of well-
definded problems in section 2.2), thus making learning irrelevant (Einhorn/Hogarth 1981: 78; 
Newell/Bröder 2008: 196, 198). 
 
4.3 Heuristics and History 
 
The term ‘heuristic’ is of Greek origin, translated as ‘serving to find out or discover’. From the 
19th century up until the 1970ies, ‘heuristics’ referred to useful cognitive processes that could 
not be dealt with by logic and probability theory. In 1905, Albert Einstein used the term 
‘heuristic’ in his Nobel Prize-winning paper “On a heuristic point of view concerning the 
generation and transformation of light” to show that he considered the view he presented as 
incomplete, even false, but nonetheless useful. From Einstein’s perspective, a heuristic can be 
seen as an approach to a problem that is necessarily incomplete given the knowledge at hand, and 
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therefore unavoidably false, but nevertheless helpful for leading thinking in the right directions 
(Gigerenzer/Todd/The ABC Research Group 1999: 25f).  
Some decades later, Gestalt psychologists11 carried the idea a bit further and spoke of ‘heuristic 
reasoning’. They conceptualized thinking as interaction between mental processes and external 
problem structure. Herbert Simon and Allen Newell subsequently modeled heuristics for search 
with more precise computational models. Information processing theory in cognitive psychology 
elaborated the meaning of a heuristic as a useful shortcut, an approximation, or a rule of thumb 
for guiding search (Gigerenzer/Todd/The ABC Research Group 1999: 26). 
In the 1960ies, Ward Edwards made a fundamental methodological contribution by introducing 
Bayesian analysis to psychology, setting up a normative standard with which everyday judgments 
could be compared. However, not only from Edwards’ own research, it became evident that 
intuitive judgments of probability did not correspond to the ‘golden’ normative benchmark. 
Consequently, a lot of research was carried out to discover the causes of suboptimal performance 
and strategies for improvement (Gilovich/Griffin 2002: 2). 
                                            
11 Gestalt psychology is, per definition, “a school of thought that looks at the human mind and behavior as a whole” 
(http://psychology.about.com/od/schoolsofthought/f/gestalt_faq.htm, retrieved on 08/2010).  According to this 
approach, the cognitive system shows the tendency to automatically minimize inconsistencies between given pieces 
of information so as to form consistent mental representations, i.e. “Gestalten” (Glöckner/Betsch 2008). 
Cognitive Heuristics and Biases and Their Impact on Negotiations                                            17 
 
 
 
“The only real valuable thing is intuition.” 
(Albert Einstein) 
5. The Heuristics and Biases Program  
 
In the 1970ies, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman introduced a program of research on 
judgment under uncertainty, which became known as the ‘heuristics and biases approach’. 
They suggested that intuitive predictions and judgments rest on a “limited number of heuristic 
principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to 
simpler judgmental operations” (Tversky/Kahneman 1974: 1124). The main goal of the research 
was to gain insight into the cognitive processes that lead to both valid and invalid judgments: 
Each heuristic was associated with a set of biases – departures from the normative classical model 
of rational choice (Gilovich/Griffin 2002: 1ff; Kahneman/Tversky 1996: 582).  
In contrast to the ‘cognitive miser’ view (Fiske/Taylor 1991) that sees heuristics as simplifications 
of a task produced by idle and negligent minds12, Tversky and Kahneman regard processes of 
intuitive judgment not as simplifications of rational models, but as different in kind. The main 
general-purpose heuristics of their program underlying intuitive judgments under uncertainty are 
representativeness, availability, and anchoring and adjustment, later having been enlarged 
by the affect heuristic. 
 
There are three aspects crucial to the program: 
 
 Heuristics are per se intelligent assessment procedures that are – in spite of their 
deviations from normative reasoning processes – by no means ‘irrational’.  
 Although heuristics lead to “quick and dirty” solutions, they make use of highly 
sophisticated underlying processes in the human’s mind.  
 Heuristics are not exceptional responses in order to reduce mental effort due to 
information overload or high complexity, but can be seen as normal intuitive answers to 
even the simplest questions about probability, frequency and prediction (Gilovich/Griffin 
2002: 3f). 
 
 
                                            
12 See Fiske, Susan T./Taylor, Shelley E. (19912): Social Cognition, McGraw-Hill, NY. 
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5.1 Representativeness 
 
As uncertainty is an unavoidable part of our lives, choices must be based on our beliefs about the 
likelihood of uncertain events. Intuitive judgment thus is often the only practical method for 
assessing uncertainty. ‘Correct’ probabilities of events cannot be easily defined, as everyone has a 
different knowledge or holds different beliefs and therefore assesses different probabilities to the 
same event; however: subjective probabilities can fulfill the requirements of probability theory 
(Tversky/Kahneman 2002: 19). 
People do not follow the principles of probability theory in judging the likelihood of an uncertain 
event. This is also due to the fact that the laws of chance are neither intuitively evident, nor easy 
to apply. Deviations of subjective probability from objective probability are the resulting 
phenomenon (Kahneman/Tversky 1982: 32). 
If a decision maker follows the representativeness heuristic he assesses the probability of an 
uncertain event or a sample by the degree to which it is: (a) similar in crucial properties to its 
parent population, and (b) reflects the outstanding features of the process by which it is 
generated. In many situations, an event X will be judged more probable than an event Y, given 
that X appears more representative; people tend to consistently judge the more representative 
event to be more likely, whether this is the case or not (Kahneman/Tversky 1982: 33). 
 
Presented as such, representativeness is “an assessment of the degree of correspondence 
between a sample and a population, an instance and a category, an act and an actor or, more 
generally, between an outcome and a model.” (Tversky/Kahneman 2002: 22). When the model 
and the outcomes can be described in the same terms, representativeness is reduced to similarity: 
A sample, for example, appears representative if its outstanding characteristics match the 
corresponding parameters of the population; a person may seem representative of a particular 
social group if he resembles the stereotypical member of that group. – Stereotyping is a typical 
feature of representativeness as information is usually stored and processed in relation to mental 
models, such as prototypes and schemata. Representativeness furthermore may covary with 
frequency as frequent events tend to be more representative than unusual events (e.g., a 
representative winter day is cold and snowy) (Tversky/Kahneman 2002: 23). 
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5.1.1.  The Conjunction Fallacy 
 
A judgment is given the label ‘fallacy’ if most of the people who commit it, are willing to accept – 
after thorough explanation – that they made a nontrivial, conceptual error and that they should 
have known better due to knowledge already available (like, for example, knowledge of statistical 
rules) (Tversky/Kahneman 2002: 34).   
 
The conjunction fallacy shows the contrast between the extensional logic that underlies most 
formal conceptions of probability and the natural assessments that are intrinsic to many 
judgments and beliefs:  
The most fundamental principle of probability is the extension rule: If A includes B, then the 
probability of B cannot exceed the probability of A, or: P(A) ≥ P(B), expressed in the 
conjunction rule as: P(A&B) ≤ P(A), where A&B constitute a subset of A.  – A conjunction 
cannot be more probable than one of its constituents (Kahneman/Tversky 1996: 585); intuitive 
judgments, however, are in general not extensional. Violations of extensional logic of probability 
theory while applying the representativeness heuristic can be shown in the Linda example:  
 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, 
she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in 
anti-nuclear demonstrations. 
- Linda is a teacher in elementary school. 
- Linda works in a bookstore and takes Yoga classes. 
- Linda is active in the feminist movement. (F) 
- Linda is a psychiatric social worker. 
- Linda is member of the League of Women Voters. 
- Linda is a bank teller. (T) 
- Linda is an insurance salesperson. 
- Linda is a bank teller and active in the feminist movement. (T&F) 
 
 
The description of Linda is supposed to be representative of an active feminist (F) and 
unrepresentative of a bank teller (T). In their set of studies (from 1974 ongoing) Tversky and 
Kahneman expected the ratings of representativeness to be higher for the classes of conjunction 
attributes (T&F) than for the less representative constituent of each conjunction. The 
respondents, undergraduates at the University of British Columbia, confirmed their expectations 
by displaying a ranking order of F>T&F>T, thus violating the conjunction rule 
(Tversky/Kahneman 2002: 23f; 43).  
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Other studies were conducted, trying to induce the respondents to apply the conjunction rule by 
simplifying the personality sketch of Linda to the following description: 
 
a. Linda is a bank teller. (T) 
b. Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement. (T&F) 
Which alternative is more probable? 
 
Still, undergraduates ranked option b more probable. Tversky and Kahneman, though, came to 
the conclusion that profound statistical knowledge can lead respondents to conform to the rule, 
after having conducted the Linda study with graduate students of social sciences at the University 
of California and at Stanford University (but nonetheless: knowledge does not alter intuitions 
about representativeness) (Tversky/Kahneman 2002: 26ff; 44). 
Furthermore, they found out that when they omitted the sketch of Linda’s personality and solely 
described her as ’31-year-old woman’, almost all respondents followed the conjunction rule, thus 
ranking the conjunction (bank teller and active feminist) as less probable than its constituents.  
This can be shown in their M  A paradigm:   
 
 
         
     
  
                         
 
Fig 5: The MA Paradigm (see Tversky/Kahneman 2002). 
 
 
The conjunction error in the Linda problem can be attributed to the relation M (Linda’s 
personality) and event A (highly representative: active feminist, therefore a strong positive 
association), not to the relation between A and B (unrepresentative: bank teller) 
(Tversky/Kahneman 2002: 35).   
 
 
 
 
M 
A B 
+ _ 
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5.1.2 Base-rate Neglect  
 
Insensitivity to prior probability of outcomes is another bias of the representativeness heuristic: 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974: 1124) stated that prior probabilities will be neglected if people 
evaluate probability by representativeness.  
 
The neglect of base-rate (or: a priori) data can be shown in the following problem 
(Tversky/Kahneman 1980):  
 
A cab was involved in a hit and run accident at night. Two cab companies, the Green and the 
Blue, operate in the city. You are given the following data:  
(a) 85% of the cabs in the city are Green and 15% are Blue. 
(b) A witness identified the cab as Blue. The court tested the reliability of the witness under 
the same circumstances that existed on the night of the accident and concluded that the 
witness correctly identified each one of the two colors 80% of the time and failed 20% of 
the time. 
Question: What is the probability that the cab involved in the accident was Blue rather 
than Green? 
 
Rev. Thomas Bayes focused on situations in which there are two possible beliefs or hypotheses 
and demonstrated how new information or data can change the probabilities of the two 
hypotheses. According to Bayes’ theorem, probabilities are combined in order to work out the 
impact of new evidence on a pre-existing probability (Eysenck 20042: 338).  
To come to the right conclusion, B and G denote the hypotheses that the cab involved in the 
accident was Blue or Green, and W denotes the witness’s report (cab = Blue). Applying Bayes’ 
theorem, with prior chances of 15/85 and a likelihood ratio of 80/20, 
 
P(B/W) / P(G/W) = P(W/B)P(B) / P(W/G)P(G) 
 = (0.8) (0.15) / (0.2) (0.85) = 12/17 
therefore: P(B/W)  = 12/(12+17)= 0.41= 41% 
 
However, most of the respondents in the cab study focused on the evidence of the eye-witness, 
thus claiming that there was an 80% probability that the cab was Blue. The discrepancy shows 
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that the participants tended to ignore the base-rate information, which was only 15% of the cabs 
being Blue (Tversky/Kahneman 1982: 156f). 
A different pattern of judgments could be observed when the incidental base rate of cabs was 
replaced by a causal base rate, i.e. of accidents. Consequently, formulation (a) was replaced with 
 
(a’) Although the two companies are roughly equal in size, 85% of cab accidents in the 
city involve Green cabs and 15% involve Blue cabs. 
 
The rewording presented a causal relationship between the accident record of the cab company 
and the likelihood of it being responsible for a given accident. Base-rate information was now 
partially taken into account, though answers were to a great extent inconsistent 
(Tversky/Kahneman 1982: 157; Eysenck 20042: 340). 
 
5.1.3  Attribute Substitution 
 
Kahneman and Frederick (2002: 53) suggested a formulation in which complex tasks are reduced 
to simpler operations by an operation labeled attribute substitution: “Judgment is mediated by a 
heuristic when an individual assesses a specified target attribute of a judgment object by 
substituting another property of that object – the heuristic attribute – which comes more readily to 
mind.”  
 
The role of attribute substitution can be shown in the study by Fritz Strack et al. (1988)13 in 
which college students answered two questions successionally: “How happy are you with your life 
in general?” and “How many dates did you have last month?” The correlation between these two 
questions was little when presented in the order above, but rose to 0.66 when the questions were 
asked vice versa. It could be deduced that the dating question evoked an affectively charged 
evaluation of one’s romantic life, which becomes the heuristic attribute when the happiness 
question is asked subsequently: The love status stands pars pro toto for the general well-being. 
(Kahneman/Frederick 2002: 53; Kahneman 2003: 1461).   
 
                                            
13 See Strack, F./Martin, L. L./Schwarz, N. (1988): Priming and Communication. The Social Determinants of 
Information Use in Judgments of Life-satisfaction, European Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 18, pp. 429-442.  
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Attribute substitution takes place when the target attribute cannot be recalled immediately (e.g., 
happiness in general), but the search for it brings to mind the value of other attributes (e.g. love 
life) that possess an associative relationship with the target attribute. In the example above the 
effect of momentary ease of access results in the ‘romantic satisfaction heuristic’ 
(Kahneman/Frederick 2002: 54f). 
In the Linda study, the respondents substitute a judgment of representativeness (similarity) for 
the desired judgment of probability: The personality sketch resembles a feminist bank teller more 
than it resembles a stereotype bank teller – the study endorses the hypotheses of attribute 
substitution and shows a foreseeable error in judgment (Kahneman/Frederick 2002: 62; 
Kahneman 2003: 1461).  
 
5.2 Availability 
 
According to Tversky and Kahneman (1974: 1127), “people assess the frequency of a class or the 
probability of an event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can be brought to mind.” 
– As instances of larger classes are normally recalled better and quicker than instances of less 
frequent classes, this presents a helpful cue for judging frequency and probability. 
 
The judgmental heuristic in application is called availability; relying on this heuristic may lead to 
biases due to the retrievability of instances: a class whose instances are brought to mind more 
easily will appear more numerous than a class of equal frequency but whose instances are not that 
easily brought to mind (e.g., deaths due to car crashes will be found more often in the newspaper 
than deaths due to stomach cancer). Other factors, such as salience (an outstanding feature) may 
have an effect on the retrievability of instances (e.g., seeing some event has a different impact 
than reading about it); also recent occurrences are probably more available than earlier 
occurrences (Tversky/Kahneman 1974: 1127).   
 
Tversky and Kahneman (1982: 166f) conducted a study on the judgment of frequency of letters 
in the English language: Is it more probable that a word, sampled at random from an English 
text, starts with K or that K is its third letter? People assess the ease with which words come to 
their mind that start with K; therefore the letter K is judged to be more frequent at the first place, 
even though a typical text contains twice as many words in which K actually is in the third 
position.  
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5.3 Anchoring and Adjustment 
 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974: 1128) defined anchoring as a process in which “people make 
estimates by starting from an initial value that is adjusted to yield the final answer 
[and]…adjustments are typically insufficient.”  
 
Like the other heuristics, anchoring may present a useful way of making judgments. An example: 
Trying to set a value on an antique chair, you recall having seen a similar chair at another antique 
dealer in a little better condition.  – The price of the other chair may serve as a reservation price 
(i.e. the sum one would be willing to pay at most). (Chapman/Gretchen 2002: 120).  
 
The term ‘anchoring’ first refers to the anchoring procedure, in which an outstanding but 
uninformative number is presented to the respondents. Experimental result is the influence of this 
uninformative number on judgments. Third, anchoring and adjustment is used to refer to the 
psychological process by which the uninformative number has its effect (Chapman/Gretchen 2002: 
121).   
Most anchoring studies apply a two-step procedure as introduced by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974): An opening comparison task is followed by a numeric estimation of the target.  For 
example: participants were asked to estimate the percentage of African countries in the United 
Nations; a number was determined by spinning a wheel of fortune. Then, participants were asked 
to indicate whether the percentage was higher or lower than the value and subsequently to make 
an estimation by moving upward or downward from that value: Indeed, the random number 
served as an anchor; the participants did not move too far away from the quantity given 
(Tversky/Kahneman 1974: 1128).  
 
The three stages at which an anchoring mechanism could occur is shown in the following figure: 
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Fig 6: Stages of the Anchoring Mechanism (see Chapman/Johnson 2002). 
 
 
At the first stage, information regarding the target is retrieved through search of memory or the 
environment; information similar to an available anchor might be positioned first. – People tend 
to evaluate hypotheses by attempting to confirm them, thus search may yield evidence that is 
disproportionately consistent with a present anchor. The information then is integrated to lead to 
an overall target judgment – at this stage, greater weight might be given to information 
compatible with the anchor. Finally, the anchor might have an influence on how the judgment is 
presented on the external scale (Chapman/Gretchen 2002: 126; Epley/Gilovich 2002: 140). 
Explanations for insufficient adjustment might be lack of effort (e.g., anchoring on one piece of 
information and underweighting ensuing knowledge) or lack of cognitive resources that lead to 
answers not too far away from the anchor. Neither pointing out to the participants to give 
attention to their own anchoring nor the presence of incentives resulted in a reduction in the 
occurrence of anchors (Chapman/Gretchen 2002: 125). Cognitive processes also differ when an 
anchor is provided by an experimenter or by another external source; self-generated anchors 
activate a different set of mental operations (Epley/Gilovich 2002: 147f). 
 
5.4.  The Affect Heuristic 
 
In their later work, Tversky and Kahneman came to the conclusion that the anchoring heuristic 
should be replaced as a major general-purpose heuristic by the affect heuristic: There is undeniable 
evidence that every stimulus evokes an affective evaluation; this evaluation normally occurs 
unconsciously (Kahneman/Frederick 2002: 56). 
 
Anchor 
 
Retrieve 
and select 
information 
 
Integrate 
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Form 
response 
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Affect as used here refers to the specific quality of ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ experienced as a 
feeling. Affective responses occur fast and automatically and are very often the first reactions to a 
stimulus and therefore guiding information processing and judgment. According to Zajonc 
(1980), every perception has an affective component: “We sometimes delude ourselves that we 
proceed in a rational manner and weight all the pros and cons of the various alternatives. But this 
is probably seldom the actual case. […] We buy the cars we ‘like’, choose the jobs and houses we 
find ‘attractive’, and then justify these choices by various reasons.” (Zajonc 1980: 155, in: Slovic 
et al. 2002: 398, op.  cit.). The emotional basis is one of the characteristics of System 1 (intuition): 
Despite the necessity of thorough analysis of decision-making problems, reliance on affect 
presents the quicker and more efficient way to navigate with limited mental resources in a 
complex and uncertain, sometimes even dangerous world (Slovic et al 2002: 397f). 
Damasio (1994) argued that thought is made up to a large part by images that include sounds, 
smells, real or imagined perceptual impressions, ideas and words. Due to lifelong learning these 
images receive a ‘marker’ of positive and negative feelings linked to somatic states of a person. 
Somatic markers are supposed to increase the efficiency and accuracy of a decision process; 
their absence is supposed to worsen decision performance, which has been observed in people 
with certain types of brain damage (Damasio 1994: 174, in: Slovic 2002: 399, op. cit.).  
 
Another proposition is that the affect heuristic has its origin in risk perception: Alhakami and 
Slovic (1994)14 discovered that the inverse relationship between perceived risk and perceived 
benefit showed a linkage to the strength of positive or negative affect related to an activity; i.e. 
people also make their judgments on the basis of their feelings about it, thus judging risks as low 
if they like a certain activity (high benefits) and vice versa (Slovic et al. 2002: 410f).  
 
Reliance on affect may also deceive us – deliberate manipulation of affect in order to influence 
judgments and decisions can be found in the advertising industry to a large extent: Manipulation 
of affect is more subtle than persuasive argumentation and taking place without our 
consciousness. Cigarette advertising, for example, is designed to increase positive affect 
(cowboys, nature,…) associated with smoking, which at the same time is likely to decrease 
perceptions of risk (Slovic et al. 2002: 416ff).  
 
                                            
14 See Alhakami, A. S./Slovic, P. (1994): A Psychological Study of the Inverse Relationship Between Perceived Risk 
and Perceived Benefit, Risk Analysis, Vol. 14, pp. 1085-1096. 
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5.5 Critique on the ‘Heuristics and Biases’ Program 
 
The main critique on the program was that it presents human beings as erroneous and biased 
creatures (“We cannot be that dumb”) that make use of heuristics due to their cognitive 
limitations (heuristics = second-best solutions) or to save mental effort (cognitive miser view) 
(Gilovich/Griffin 2002: 8).  
Gigerenzer (2000), a vigorous critic of the program, put it that way:  
 
“In artificial intelligence research one hopes that heuristics can make computers smart; in the 
‘heuristics and biases’ program one hopes that heuristics can tell why humans are not smart. […] 
Rather than explaining a deviation between human judgment and allegedly ‘correct’ probabilistic 
reasoning, future research has to get rid of simplistic norms that evaluate human judgment instead of 
explaining it.“ (p. 260) 
 
 
I want to present two different approaches to conjunctive thinking and base-rate neglect as 
proposed by Gigerenzer et al.: 
 
5.5.1          The Conjunction Fallacy Revisited 
 
Hertwig and Gigerenzer (1999:275ff) reproach Tversky and Kahneman with using the 
conjunction rule in a “content-blind way”: The Linda example is reduced to the terms 
‘probability’ and ‘and’, supposed to be interpreted as mathematical probability. Humans, 
however, possess the ability to make semantic and pragmatic inferences. By making an 
inference about the instruction, the term ‘probability’ is interpreted as nonmathematical, but as 
“something which, judged by present evidence, is likely to happen” or as a “credible story”.  Also 
the personality sketch of Linda is taken into account; the assumption is made that a simple 
mathematical interpretation of the problem would render the description of Linda irrelevant 
(Sloman 2002: 386). This was later acted on by Tversky and Kahneman (2002) in their M  A 
paradigm as explained in Section 5.1.1.  
In summary, Gigerenzer and Hertwig (1999: 278) suggest that, if semantic inference by social 
rationality is applied, then T&F is not a violation of the conjunction rule as probability in the 
mathematical sense is not being assessed. 
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5.5.2          Bayesian Reasoning Revisited  
 
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995: 684ff) propose that Bayesian algorithms are computationally 
simpler if they are presented in frequency formats rather than probability formats, i.e. there are 
fewer operations needed and operations can be performed on natural numbers (absolute 
frequencies) rather than percentages. Frequency formats are supposed to correspond to the 
sequential way in which information is acquired in natural sampling. This can be depicted in a 
natural sampling tree: Coming back to the cab example as presented in section 5.1.2, probabilities 
can be shown in frequencies, with the lower branches presenting 80% and 20% of the respective 
base rates (85 Green, 15 Blue). For solving the equation, base rates need not be attended to, as 
we just need the numbers of the witness’s account:  
 
P(B/W) = 12/(12+17) = 41% 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
Fig 7: Cab Example: Natural Sampling of Frequencies. 
 
 
Despite studies that even fourth graders can compute the Bayesian way if they are presented 
numbers in natural frequencies (Zhu/Gigerenzer 2006), this approach contains certain 
shortcomings: Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) put emphasis on the fact that their results hold 
for an elementary form of Bayesian inference with binary hypotheses and data. Therefore it is 
unlikely that frequency formats would extract Bayesian algorithms, when the human inference 
has to handle several cues or data that are not independent.  
 
 
100 
15 85 
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Cognitive Heuristics and Biases and Their Impact on Negotiations                                            29 
 
 
 
5.6 The Difference between Judgmental and Choice Heuristics 
 
Judgmental heuristics in Tversky and Kahneman’s sense are largely based on impressions that arise 
automatically and independently of any explicit judgmental goal. They are natural assessments 
that are carried out as a part of the perception of events and the understanding of messages.  In 
the case of Linda, people notice the dissimilarity of a stereotype bank teller and the description of 
a political activist spontaneously. This intuitive judgment may be used to come to the conclusion 
that Linda is unlikely to be a bank teller by attribute substitution (Tverksy/Kahneman 2002: 20; 
Frederick 2002: 549).  
An important feature of judgmental heuristics is that people do not view this process as a 
heuristic, as they do not make deliberate use of it to save mental effort. The use of similarity to 
judge probability is labeled a heuristic only in comparison with a normative standard of judgment 
(Frederick 2002: 549). 
Choice heuristics, on the other hand, represent conscious strategies, intentionally designed to 
simplify choice. In case of a decision maker being shown a matrix of numbers summarizing the 
attributes of his choice problem, no intuitive computation generates an image of which option is 
best. Thus, the decision maker has to deliberately decide how to proceed and which strategy to 
apply.  – Many decision theorists conducted studies with Herbert Simon’s view of humans’ 
computational and memory limitations at the back of their minds. How do people make 
reasonable decisions when they are confronted with an information overload or complex 
situations? Researchers usually use stimuli that are abstract and do not bring to mind any intuitive 
impression. As a consequence, some type of analytical solution will be chosen (Frederick 2002: 
548f).  
 
In general, traditional judgmental heuristics can be seen as originating from System 1 (resulting 
from cognitive processes that are fast and not completely controllable), while traditional choice 
heuristics can be seen as originating from System 2 (resulting from slower and more intentional 
cognitive processes) (Frederick 2002: 549).  
Whereas chapter 5 dealt with judgmental heuristics, chapter 6 will focus on choice heuristics.  
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“Make everything as simple as possible, but not simpler.” 
(Albert Einstein) 
6. ABC’s Heuristics: The Adaptive Toolbox   
 
The ‘fast and frugal’ heuristics of the Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition (abbr. 
ABC, director: Gerd Gigerenzer) at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin 
present System 2 heuristics for the most part as they are intentionally chosen in order to reduce 
computational burden. ABC is an interdisciplinary research group that was founded in 1995; its 
premise is the following: 
“The Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition investigates reasoning and decision 
making under uncertainty at the levels of both individuals and social groups. The research 
group consists of psychologists, mathematicians, computer scientists, evolutionary biologists, 
economists, and researchers from other fields. With different methodological abilities, such as 
experimental methods, computer simulation, and mathematical analysis, they cooperate in solving the 
same problems.  
The ABC program combines a strong theoretical focus with practical applications, that is, the 
research group both develops specific models and explores their applications. Applications range from 
helping physicians and patients understand the statistical evidence arising from medical research, 
helping courts, administrators, and legislators understand the importance of heuristic thinking in the 
law, and improving teaching practices in statistical education by introducing transparent 
representation formats. The theoretical focus is on rationality and can be divided into 
three aspects: bounded, ecological, and social rationality.” 15 
 
6.1.  Visions of Rationality 
 
According to the ABC research group (Gigerenzer/Todd 1999: 5f), human beings as well as 
animals have to make inductive inferences about the world they live in with limited time, 
knowledge and computational capacities. Many normative models of rational inference, however, 
see the mind as omniscient, i.e. in possession of demonic powers of reason, unlimited knowledge 
and an eternal span of time for making decisions. In their research work, ABC replaces the 
picture of the all-knowing mind with a bounded mind that has an adaptive toolbox full of fast 
and frugal (or ‘simple’) heuristics at its disposal. These heuristics are fast because information 
search is less cognitively demanding, and they are frugal because they use only a small amount of 
the information at hand. ABC’s heuristics indeed make inferences with limited time and 
                                            
15  http://www.mpib-berlin.mpg.de/en/forschung/abc/index.htm (retrieved on 07/2010). 
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knowledge without having to compute probabilities or utilities; they belong to the class of 
bounded rationality, which can be depicted in the following graph:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 8: Visions of Rationality (see Gigerenzer/Todd 1999). 
 
 
Demons (with reference to the French mathematician and astronomer Pierre Simon de Laplace 
who pondered about an omniscient genius) can be split into two categories:  
Unbounded rationality is traditionally realized in maximization of expected utility and Bayesian 
models, assuming that people possess unrealistic cognitive abilities and an unlimited amount of 
time. Optimization under constraints, on the other hand, no longer assumes the omniscience 
of unbounded rationality; like the other concepts it focuses on limited information search which 
requires a stopping rule that tells when to stop looking for new information. Under this vision of 
rationality, search stops when the costs of finding new information are outweighing marginal 
benefits. The problems are obvious: first, estimates of costs (including opportunity costs) and 
benefits demand profound knowledge; the second problem is that of infinite regression (cost-
benefit computations); third, demands of knowledge and computation knowhow can be so high 
that an ordinary person is supposed to act like an econometrician (Sargent 1993)16 
(Gigerenzer/Todd 1999: 8ff; Gigerenzer/Selten 2001: 5; Gigerenzer 2006: 22).  
 
Bounded rationality follows the tradition of Herbert Simon (1955, 1956, and 1990; also see 
section 3.2) who wanted to construct a more realistic theory of human economic decision 
making: In Simon’s view, the limitations of the human mind and the structure of the 
environment in which the mind operates represent two interlocking components (pair of scissors 
                                            
16 See Sargent, T.J. (1993): Bounded Rationality in Macroeconomics, Oxford Univ. Press, NY. 
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example). Environmental structure should explain when and why simple heuristics succeed: the 
structure of the heuristic is supposed to be adapted to the environment in which it performs. The 
ABC research group uses the term ecological rationality to prescribe how a heuristic should be 
adapted to the structure of the environment – a heuristic is ecologically rational if it performs 
well in a real-world environment. Models of bounded rationality do not only describe the outcome 
of a decision process, but the process itself, namely how the decision is reached (Gigerenzer/Todd 
1999: 12f; Gigerenzer/Selten 2001: 4; Selten 2001: 16; Gigerenzer 2006: 23). 
One category of bounded rationality is satisficing17: Evolutionary pressures do not make people 
optimize globally (i.e. choose the best possible alternative), but instead make them optimize locally. 
An adjustable aspiration level is set to reduce the costs of information processing. As soon as an 
alternative is reached that exceeds the aspiration level (by comparing alternatives sequentially), 
search stops. Setting an appropriate aspiration level, however, can still require a large amount of 
cognitive capacities (Simon 1956; Hogarth 19892: 65; Gigerenzer/Todd 1999: 13f; 
Gilovich/Griffin 2002: 9). 
The second category of bounded rationality is presented by fast and frugal heuristics, 
contained in an adaptive toolbox, which the human mind draws on for making decisions under 
uncertainty. ABC considers them to be “bounded rationality in its purest form” 
(Todd/Gigerenzer 2000: 740). 
 
6.2  Characteristics of Fast and Frugal Heuristics 
 
A heuristic in ABC’s sense has the qualities of exploiting evolved capacities (like tracking objects 
as done with the gaze heuristic, see section 4.1) as well as exploiting the structures of the 
environment. The latter means that the rationality of heuristics is ecological, rather than logical, 
i.e. heuristics cannot be categorized as rational or irrational per se, but – as they are context-
bound – must be seen in relation to the environment in which they are applied.  Thus, the 
potential of heuristics lies in their performance in a suitable environment: like the blades of 
scissors, the structure of the environment and the cognitive heuristics are required to match. As 
domain-specificity is a main feature of ABC’s heuristics, their success or failure depends on the 
respective environment (Todd 2001: 52; Gigerenzer 2004: 63f; Raab/Gigerenzer 2005: 193).  
The following arguments (Raab/Gigerenzer 2005: 196) endorse domain-specific intelligence:  
                                            
17 The word, a blend of sufficing and satisfying, is of Northumbrian origin, a region in England on the Scottish border, 
where it meant ‘to satisfy‘(Gigerenzer/Todd 1999: 13). 
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 Stating the US-psychologist Jerome Bruner (1973), much of intelligence involves going 
“beyond the information given”, i.e. humans have to make sensible inferences on the 
basis of little or incomplete information.   
 An omniscient mechanism not only is infeasible but would lead to computational 
explosion. – The more general, the slower a system.  
 Human intelligence comprises the interaction between cognitive as well as social and 
emotional abilities.  
 
Fast and frugal heuristics make a trade-off on the dimension generality versus specificity: ABC’s 
domain-specific heuristics can be as accurate as complex computational models by only using 
some of the available information (one or a few cues or features) while at the same time 
neglecting more variable uninformative cues. Overfitting, on the other hand, describes the failure 
of generalization – the assumption that every detail and every free parameter has to be taken into 
account for making precise inferences (Gigerenzer/Todd/The ABC Research Group 1999: 18f). 
Many theories of rationality assume that all the information and evidence available should be 
used for the final judgment and decision. Heuristics in that sense are seen as a trade-off between 
accuracy and effort (the amount of information that is integrated and used for cognitive 
computation). This trade-off, however, does not hold for all situations. Indeed, less-is-more 
effects describe a point where obtaining more information and doing more calculations could 
decrease accuracy. It is important to note that less-is-more does not always refer to better 
performance by using less information; it rather explains that there exists a point where additional 
pieces of information would become disadvantageous, even if there were no calculation costs and 
information was free. ABC’s heuristics make use of less information by ignoring cues and 
dependencies between cues (Gigerenzer/Brighton 2009: 110f). 
Furthermore, simple heuristics’ performance is not measured according to the coherence criterion of 
rationality (that demands internal logical consistency, intensive information search and integration 
of information), but by the success of their adaptive inferences (how well they work in the 
external world). The latter approach can be subsumed as correspondence criterion of 
rationality. The US-psychologist Egon Brunswik (1957) once compared the mind and the 
environment to husband and wife who have to arrange with one another by mutual adaptation18. 
As they have become estranged, ABC’s goal is to get the couple on a corresponding level again, 
even if they will not act coherently (Gigerenzer/Todd/The ABC Research Group 1999: 18ff). 
                                            
18 See Brunswik, E. (1957): Scope and Aspects of the Cognitive Problem, in: H. Gruber et al. (eds.): 
Contemporary Approaches to Cognition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA), pp. 5-31. 
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Another important aspect of simple heuristics is that of social rationality (a special form of 
ecological rationality). Social rationality refers to the ability of humans to interact with others in 
an intelligent way. The two main characteristics of social environments are the following: First, by 
the speed with which they can change and second, by the need to take not only one’s own, but 
the behavior and decisions of others as well into consideration; this also requires coordination. 
Social goals are crucial for building and nourishing social structure and cooperation. These goals 
are expected to comprise transparency (which decisions are understandable and predicable by the 
group?), fairness (which decisions do not violate the expectations between people of equal social 
standing?) and accountability (which decisions can be justified?) (Gigerenzer/Todd/The ABC 
Research Group 1999: 25; Gigerenzer 2001: 48).  
 
6.3 Classes of Heuristics 
 
The adaptive toolbox provides heuristics that are composed of cognitive and emotional building 
blocks. These building blocks can be part of more than one heuristic as they are more general 
than the heuristics themselves. The three functions of the building blocks are the following:  
 
 Guiding search: Alternatives (the choice set) and cues (for evaluation of alternatives) 
have to be found through active search. Simon’s concept of satisficing involves searching 
for alternatives, whereas fast and frugal heuristics search for cues. 
Heuristic principles for guiding search may tell that the search for cues can be random or 
in order of some criterion related to the cue’s validity or based on which cues worked 
well for similar decisions previously made. 
Generally speaking, emotions can set limits to the search for choice sets and cues more 
successfully and for a longer span of time than cognitive tools.  
 
 Stopping search: Search for alternatives and information must be stopped at some 
point. However, simple stopping rules do not deal with cost-benefit calculations as in 
optimization under constraints; indeed, one of the simple stopping rules would stop 
search as soon as the first cue in favor of one alternative is found. 
Also in here, emotions can be successful tools for stopping search. Whereas cognitive 
stopping rules could be instable with regard to the aspiration level – e.g., leaving one’s 
partner every time someone more attractive comes along –, emotions can stop the search 
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for a partner for a longer time and enable commitment. The same holds for rearing one’s 
child: parental love dispenses with cost-benefit calculations when it comes to bearing all 
the sleepless nights with the crying infant.   
 
 Decision making: A decision rule tells how to proceed after the search has been 
stopped. For example, decisions can be made by a simple elimination process, where 
successive cues eliminate alternative after alternative until one final choice is left.  
 
ABC’s working hypothesis is that people make use of a range of heuristics contingent on the 
environment in which they are applied. The evolved mind will be ascribed the function of an 
adaptive toolbox that contains specific heuristics tailored to handle different types of decision 
problems (Gigerenzer/Todd/The ABC Research Group 1999: 16f; Gigerenzer 2001: 43ff; 
Marsh/Todd/Gigerenzer 2004: 275; Raab/Gigerenzer 2005: 194f). 
 
Fast and frugal heuristics can be divided into three classes:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 9: Overview of ABC’s Heuristics. 
 
6.3.1           Ignorance-Based Decision Making: The Recognition 
                                Heuristic  
 
An illustration (Marsh/Todd/Gigerenzer 2004: 276): Imagine you are on a journey through an exotic 
country and invited for ham and eggs. You have to choose between eggs with either green or yellow yolks. Which 
eggs would you like to eat?  
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Sometimes the situation arises where the only information at hand is whether or not an option 
has ever been encountered before. One of ABC’s simplest heuristics is the recognition heuristic19: It 
makes use of the less-is-more effect by requiring a certain lack of knowledge for making efficient 
inferences about unknown aspects of the world. The recognition heuristic is based on the binary 
distinction between the previously experienced and the unfamiliar; it is defined as follows:  
 
Which of two options has a higher value on some criterion? If one of two objects is recognized and the other is not, 
then infer that the recognized object has the higher value.  
 
The search rule limits search to recognition memory. As soon as recognition has been assessed 
for both objects, search stops. Decision is based on only one piece of information: recognition. 
In case of the eggs-choice problem, the decision maker would certainly choose the yellow-yoked 
eggs as they are recognized. Hence, the recognition heuristic is a heuristic spontaneously activated 
by System 1 (recognition processes) and consciously adopted by System 2.  
Fast and frugal heuristics in ABC’s sense can therefore be seen as heuristics for “higher order 
cognitive processes that call upon lower order processes of cue perception and memory” 
(Gigerenzer/Todd 1999: 30; Goldstein/Gigerenzer 1999: 38; 41; 57; Kahneman/Frederick 2002: 
59).  
 
The ABC Research Group analyzed the use of the recognition heuristic by means of computer 
simulation, mathematical analysis and experimentation: In one experiment, they used a 
geographical topic about which their participants (students at the University of Chicago and the 
University of Munich) had only partial knowledge. The task was a two-alternative choice on the 
criterion: Which city has a larger population? When posing the question if San Diego or San 
Antonio had a larger population, 100% of the German students chose correctly (i.e. San Diego), 
in comparison to only 62% of the US-students: German students were able to make use of the 
recognition heuristic as all of them had heard of San Diego, but many among them did not 
recognize San Antonio. They were thus ignorant enough to make the correct inference 
(Goldstein/Gigerenzer 1999: 41; 43).  
 
The question arises, how the correlation between recognition and the criterion (e.g., larger) is 
estimated. Though the criterion is inaccessible (i.e. there is no direct information) in cases of 
                                            
19 NB: Recognition must not be confused with availability of the ‘Heuristis and Biases Program’:  Whereas availability is 
about (the order or speed of) recall of an object, recognition is about ignorance (Goldstein/Gigerenzer 1999: 57).  
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inference, there exist mediators in the environment that mirror the criterion and are available for 
the senses.   
 
The interaction between criterion, mediator and recognition can be depicted in the following 
graph:  
 
                       
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
    
 
 
Fig 10: The Ecological Rationality of the Recognition Heuristic (see Goldstein/Gigerenzer 1999). 
 
 
A newspaper could function as a mediator (as it is accessible); the more often a city is mentioned 
in it, the more likely it is that a person will recognize the name. Due to the mediator, an inference 
about the size of the city can be made. The ecological correlation describes the relation between the 
criterion (city size) and the mediator (how often the name of the city occurs). The mediator acts 
as a surrogate for the inaccessible criterion; the surrogate correlation links the accessible environment 
and the contents of recognition memory (the number of times the city is mentioned correlating 
against recognition of these names). Recognition validity comprises the relationship between 
recognition and the criterion: the proportion of times a recognized object has a higher criterion 
value than an unrecognized object. Therefore, recognition validity α can be calculated with the 
following formula:  
 
α = R/(R+W) 
 
Criterion 
 
Mediator 
 
 Recognition 
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R stands for the number of right inferences computed across all pairs where one object is 
recognized and the other is not, and W represents the number of wrong inferences ceteris 
paribus (Goldstein/Gigerenzer 1999: 41ff). 
 
The recognition heuristic has also been tested in the stock market: Do more-often-recognized 
companies have better performing stocks? The ABC Research Group constructed investment 
portfolios of highly recognized companies, based on the information of several German and US 
participants: American participants were, inter alia, asked to select their top 10 most-recognized 
German companies, and German participants to choose the top 10 most-recognized American 
firms. The experiment was conducted during 1996-1997, and finally showed that the recognition 
heuristic was more successful than fund managers’ sophisticated strategies as well as randomly 
chosen portfolios. ABC, however, does not know yet if the results also hold in a decreasing bear 
market, as their recognition-based portfolios were obtained in a strong bull market (Borges et al. 
1999: 71; Todd 2001: 57).    
 
6.3.2  One-Reason Decision Making 
 
If several pieces of information are available and recognition cannot be applied, one-reason 
decision making relies on a single cue that favors one over the other option: Again, two objects 
will be compared on some criterion; there are several cues that can be used for assessing each 
object on the criterion.  
 
- First, a cue dimension is selected and the corresponding cue values of each option are 
appointed.  
- Second, the two alternatives are compared with regard to their binary cue values (1 = 
positive value, indicating a higher criterion value; 0 = negative value, indicating a lower 
criterion value).  
- Third, if the cue discriminates between alternatives (stopping rule), search stops and the 
option with the cue value representing a greater value on the decision criterion will be 
chosen (decision rule).  
- Forth, in case of no cue discrimination, there will be a backward loop to the first step. If 
no cue satisfies the stopping rule, a random guess is made. (Gigerenzer/Goldstein 1999a: 
79; Todd 2001: 58; Marsh/Todd/Gigerenzer 2004: 277).  
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The four steps of one-reason decision making can be shown in a flowchart:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 11: A Flowchart of One-Reason Decision Making (see Todd 2001). 
 
 
One-reason decision making heuristics are fast as they do not search through all available 
alternatives and cues, respectively as do not integrate the information, and they are frugal because 
they base their decision on a single cue.   
ABC distinguishes between three types of one-reason decision making heuristics that only differ 
in one building block: the search rule. 
 
6.3.2.1  The Minimalist 
 
An illustration (Marsh/Todd/Gigerenzer 2004: 279): You want to go on vacation – either to the 
Bahamas or to Jamaica. Your most important criterion is active outdoor leisure time. As both places are 
recognized, you select any cue at random that may refer to the criterion. For instance, does the hotel have a pool? 
Jamaica: yes (cue value = 1), Bahamas: no (cue value = 0). Thus, you infer that the hotel in Jamaica has the 
higher value on the criterion (outdoor leisure activities). 
Select a cue and check cue values of 
available alternatives 
Decide on alternative indicated by 
current cue 
Does cue discriminate 
between alternatives? 
No 
Yes 
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The minimal intuition needed for applying the minimalist heuristic is inferring correctly where 
the randomly chosen cue points. E.g., does the hotel pool indicate greater outdoor activities 
(Gigerenzer/Goldstein 1999:79f)? 
 
6.3.2.2  Take the Last 
 
An illustration (Marsh/Todd/Gigerenzer 2004: 279): You are again choosing between the Bahamas and 
Jamaica (both are recognized). Your memory tells you that last year the decisive cue was whether or not the hotel 
had easy access to boat rental. Again, this cue will be used for inference. As only the hotel in the Bahamas fulfills 
this condition, you choose going to the Bahamas. 
 
Thus, Take the Last applies the cue that stopped search last time in a similar-looking decision 
situation. When encountering the first problem, a cue will be randomly chosen like in the 
Minimalist; from the second problem onward, the cue that stopped search last time will be 
chosen. If this cue does not discriminate, the cue that stopped search the time before the last one 
will be taken, and so on. Contrary to the Minimalist, Take the Last relies on a memory record for 
which cues discriminated in the past (Gigerenzer/Goldstein 1999:80).  
 
6.3.2.3  Take the Best 
 
An illustration (Marsh/Todd/Gigerenzer 2004: 278): Now the choice for your holiday destination is 
between Bali and Tahiti (both are recognized, depicted as ++ in fig. 12). Again, the most important vacation 
criterion is active outdoor leisure time. The cue that could be best for discriminating between alternatives is 
sunshine: Both destinations have great weather forecasts. So, you turn to the second-most important cue: Is there a 
beach near the hotel? As both hotels are on beachfronts, this cue is also tied (i.e. they have the same value on the 
cue with the highest validity). The third-most important cue is chosen: Is boat rental available? You find out that 
boats are easily accessible in Tahiti, but not in Bali. Thus, the last cue will be the discriminating cue (the last step 
in fig. 12: +-): You decide to go on holiday in Tahiti. 
According to Take the Best, there will be a subjective (not ‘optimal’) ranking of cues. This 
heuristic of one-reason decision making tries the cue with the highest validity (the conditional 
probability that the cue will identify the right alternative). Potential dependencies between cues 
will not be considered and thus conflicts are avoided.  
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Therefore, Take the Best as well as the Minimalist and Take the Last belong to the group of 
noncompensatory heuristics, i.e. successive cues cannot compensate for or counteract the 
decision made by an earlier cue. They work best in environments with a similar structure: where 
each cue is more important than any combination of less valid cues. If this is the case, then there 
is a fit; its degree determines the ecological rationality of the heuristic (Gigerenzer/Goldstein 
1999: 80f; Martignon/Hoffrage 1999: 123ff).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 12: Flowchart of the Take the Best Algorithm (see Gigerenzer/Goldstein 1996). 
 
 
The ABC Research Group conducted several experiments that tested the Minimalist and the 
Take the Best’s accurateness against ‘traditional’ mechanisms that use all available information 
and combine it. Multiple regression, for example, considers dependencies between cues; Dawes’s rule 
adds up the number of positive cue values and subtracts the number of negative cue values. It 
was shown that “simplicity is a virtue, rather than a curse” (Todd 2001: 53), as these two fast and 
frugal heuristics always came close, and also exceeded, the performance of the traditional 
algorithms (Gigerenzer/Goldstein 1999: 83f).  
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6.3.3  Elimination Heuristics  
 
Often, there are situations with more available options than values in each available cue 
dimension. Thus, a single cue will not be enough to discriminate between all the alternatives.  To 
single out an option from among several alternatives will be done by elimination. There are two 
ABC’s heuristics that proceed this way: QickEst, which is used to estimate the criterion value of a 
particular object, and Categorization by Elimination, which uses one cue after the other to narrow 
down the set of remaining possible alternatives until only one is left (Todd 2001: 61; 
Marsh/Todd/Gigerenzer 2004: 281). 
 
6.3.3.1  Quick Estimation 
 
An illustration (Marsh/Todd/Gigerenzer 2004: 282): You are a marketing manager and need to estimate 
a competitor’s advertising budget, which is presumably to be tied to advertising channels. You ask yourself: Which 
channel might he use that separates it from most others? Many companies make use of local newspapers, only few 
advertise in regional papers. – Your competitor puts advertisements in larger papers. You search for the next cue: 
Does he use the national radio? The answer again is yes, so you turn to television. Your competitor does not make 
use of this channel, so the search is stopped. The estimation is made on the basis of the expected budget size of a 
company that advertises in larger newspapers and on radio, but not on TV. 
 
QuickEst works best in environments that have J-shaped distributions (i.e. they look like the 
letter ‘J’ rotated clockwise by 90 degrees). Therefore, it contradicts the assumption of educational 
researchers that knowledge, learning and performance usually conform to a bell-shaped 
distribution across individuals (where moderate values are the most frequent). For instance, when 
asked to name all the characters in Shakespeare’s Comedy of Errors, results would probably be that 
many people get a low score (recalling only a few names), and only few will achieve a high score 
(recalling many names). City population size also presents a J-distribution: there are few large 
cities and a large number of smaller ones (Hertwig/Hoffrage/Martignon 1999: 219f). 
QuickEst proceeds the following way: First, a cue has to be identified that is expected to separate 
the most common objects from all of the others. Second, you have to look at the next cue that is 
expected to separate the remaining common objects from the rest of the J-shaped distribution. 
Carry on that way until a cue is found that no longer places the object with the most common 
objects. Then, a value is attributed to the object based on the attributes of the discriminating cue 
(Marsh/Todd/Gigerenzer 2004: 282).   
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6.3.3.2  Categorization by Elimination 
 
An illustration (see Marsh/Todd/Gigerenzer 2004: 282f): You need to describe a beverage bottle. There 
are the following basic categories (color of drink/bottle shape) at your disposal: beer (amber brown/beer bottle), red 
wine (red/wine bottle), white wine (white/wine bottle), rose (pink/wine bottle), sauterne (yellow/wine bottle) and 
champagne (white/champagne bottle). It is evident, thus, that ‘color’ has the higher validity since it will identify the 
type of beverage in four cases (only white wine and champagne have the same color), while ‘bottle shape’ will do so 
in only two cases (beer, champagne). Therefore, you look at the cue ‘color’ first. Since you need ‘white’, you can 
eliminate all alternatives except champagne and white wine. The last two candidates can be distinguished by the 
discriminating criterion ‘bottle shape’. 
 
Categorization by Elimination is similar to Tversky’s Elimination by Aspects model of choice. In 
Tversky’s (1972) model20, the cues (or aspects) are selected in a probabilistic order based on their 
utility for making a decision. Remaining possibilities that do not correspond to the current aspect 
are eliminated from the choice set. The two models have in common that they make use only of 
the necessary aspects and do not integrate cues (this would be a feature of compensatory heuristics, 
where a good value on one attribute can compensate for a poor value on another).  What 
separates them is that Categorization by Elimination is a deterministic model of categorization. 
Furthermore, in Elimination by Aspects cues are selected probabilistically according to their 
weight (or validity), so that the order in which aspects are considered is not essentially the same 
for each object. In Categorization by Elimination, cues are ordered by their success measure 
before the categorization process starts, i.e. the same cue order is used to assess each object 
(Berretty/Todd/Martignon 1999: 242; 249; Payne/Bettman 2001: 126). 
 
The processing steps of Categorization by Elimination are shown in fig. 13:  
                                            
20 See Tversky, Amos (1972): Elimination by Aspects. A Theory of Choice, Psychological Review, 
Vol.79, pp. 281-299. 
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Fig 13: Flowchart of the Categorization by Elimination Algorithm (see Berretty/Todd/Martignon 1999).  
 
 
 
The process starts with a stimulus that shall be categorized; there is an initial set of possible 
categories S. The cue dimension C with the highest probability of success is chosen. Then, the 
object’s value on C is mapped to the corresponding set S* of the possible categories for that cue 
value. If S* contains only one category, the categorization process ends. Otherwise (if there is 
more than one possible category in S*), all those categories that are not in both the new and the 
old set of possibilities are eliminated. If no more cues are available, a category from S shall be 
picked at random (Berretty/Todd/Martignon 1999: 248). 
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6.4 When do People Use (Simple) Heuristics? 
 
A decision maker is supposed to choose the appropriate heuristic adaptively from his toolbox for 
a given situation. But how does he decide how to decide? One view of strategy selection is a ‘top-
down’ approach, where the decision maker evaluates the available tools in his toolbox by doing a 
cost-benefit analysis of the heuristic’s potential performance. A main concern about this view is 
that of infinite regress.  Another view involves a more ‘bottom-up’ process of decision making: 
Instead of a conscious decision on the possibly appropriate strategy, the selection of the heuristic 
reflects a learned response about what worked well in similar situations. However, this approach 
encounters the problem of how to decide in new situations. It is also probable that people select 
their strategies in a more top-down approach when faced with complex problems, but only 
moderate time pressure (Goldstein et al. 2001: 183f).  
 
Rieskamp and Otto (2006: 207ff) argue that people select the appropriate heuristic for an 
inferential choice situation on the basis of learning. They conducted experiments, in which 
feedback about the accuracy of the selected strategy was given to the participants. According to 
their Strategy Selection Learning Model (SSL), cognitive strategies will be reinforced through 
feedback. People are expected to select a strategy adaptively, depending on how well the strategy 
performed last time. However, Rieskamp and Otto (2006) admit that people might simply learn 
through stimulus-response relations as well.   
 
Time pressure, as stated above, is a critical factor that is likely to foster the use of simple 
heuristics. Consistent with Payne et al. (1993, in: Todd 2001: 64, op. cit.), the ABC research 
group assumes that limited time is an important determinant of decision making: If speed is 
weighted more highly than accuracy, information is shifted from extensive, alternative-based 
compensatory strategies to more selective, cue-based non-compensatory strategies. 
Compensatory algorithms search for all cues one alternative at a time, whereas non-
compensatory algorithms search for information about one cue at a time across all available 
alternatives.   
It can furthermore be assumed that under great time pressure people either apply the same 
decision strategy more quickly (by speeding up information gathering) or shift their decision 
strategy to a simple, cue-oriented non-compensatory heuristic (Rieskamp/Hoffrage 1999: 164). 
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6.5 The Influence of Emotions and Social Context  
 
ABC’s heuristics are for the most part based on cognitive processes. However, emotional and social 
factors are unquestionably crucial co-players in the decision process. The ABC Research Group 
(Mellers et al. 2001: 267ff) distinguishes between three types of emotions that can influence 
choice: 
 
 Background emotions 
 Task-related emotions 
 Anticipated emotions 
 
Background emotions refer to moods and emotions that are not related to the decision task, 
but still affect perception and memory. They also influence the strategies and heuristics that are 
used to process information: A happy decision maker focuses on different stimuli than an 
anxious decision maker (e.g., he may not want to change the status quo as he is satisfied with his 
current achievements). The latter one may be involved in more intensive search for alternatives; 
negative emotions can lead to more in-depth thinking and greater processing of cues (Luce et al. 
1997)21, hence possibly leading to the use of compensatory heuristics like the weighted additive 
strategy. 
Task-related emotions arise in the course of making a decision. They can promote the use of 
simpler choice heuristics to avoid emotionally difficult conflicts and trade-offs between 
alternatives. As the complexity of choice rises, people also exhibit a tendency to select their 
affectively preferred alternative more often (Hsee 1995)22. Furthermore, as time pressure plays an 
important part in decision making, maladaptive coping strategies with stress and ambiguous 
situations may lead to shunning behavior, increased wariness and panic (Janis/Mann 1977)23.  
Anticipated emotions refer to the imagination of potential outcomes and how the decision 
maker feels about them. This may involve cognitive processing or more intuitive processing, 
which is in line with Damasio’s (1994) somatic marker hypothesis (see section 5.4). Intense 
                                            
21 See Luce, Mary Frances et al (1997): Choice Processing in Emotionally Difficult Decisions, Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning Memory Cognition, Vol. 23, pp. 384-405. 
22 See Hsee, Christopher K. (1995): Elastic Justification. How tempting but Task-Irrelevant Factors influence 
Decisions, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 62, pp. 330-337. 
23  See Janis, Irving L. / Mann, Leon (1977): Decision Making. A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and 
Commitment. Free Press, NY.  
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emotions are likely to activate more intuitive processing, while milder emotions probably involve 
both cognitive and emotional processing (Le Doux 1996)24.  
 
Not only emotions, but also social context has a great influence on fast and frugal heuristics. 
One essential characteristic is represented by accountability, i.e. the demands to justify one’s 
decision to others. Tetlock (1983, in: Rieskamp/Hoffrage 1999: 165, op. cit.) assumes that people 
who are held liable for their decisions use strategies that require more cognitive effort (hence, 
compensatory ones), while expecting to achieve more accuracy by doing so. 
Furthermore, social learning is incorporated in fast and frugal social heuristics: they include 
imitation behavior strategies such as ‘do-what-the-majority-do’ or Tit-for-Tat, which recalls the 
opponent’s last move, cooperation or defection (Rieskamp/Hoffrage 1999: 165; Mellers et al. 
2001: 272).  
 
6.6 Critique on ABC’s Heuristics 
 
Oppenheimer (2003: B1-B9) conducted a study showing that people do not always conform to 
the recognition heuristic as predicted by the ABC research group: Participants were likely to 
judge a recognized city smaller than an unfamiliar one, if they had knowledge that the city in 
question was small. This clearly contrasts with the recognition heuristic’s postulation. Rather than 
inferring that recognized cities are larger than unrecognized ones, people with high probability 
took more information into consideration than one single cue, thus plunging into more in-depth 
reasoning. It could be argued that they were using some other heuristic from the adaptive 
toolbox; this interpretation, however, poses the problem that recognition is always used first in 
ABC’s one-reason decision making heuristics. 
 
Another criticism on the recognition heuristic refers to Borges et al.’s (1999) stock market 
experiment: German and American laypeople (pedestrians in downtown Chicago or Munich) as 
well as experts (finance or economics graduates from the University of Chicago or Munich) were 
asked to indicate which companies they recognized from those listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange and several German stock exchanges. The experiment included 798 companies, therein 
500 American companies of Standard & Poor’s 500 index and 298 German companies with the 
Dax 30. Two investment portfolios for each of the four groups (German laypeople and experts, 
                                            
24 See Le Doux, Joseph E. (1996): The Emotional Brain, Simon and Schuster, NY. 
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American laypeople and experts) were constructed: The ‘domestic recognition’ portfolios (4) 
contained highly recognized companies within the group’s home country; the ‘international 
recognition’ portfolios (4) consisted of the ten companies that each group recognized most often 
from the other country. The performance of the portfolios was measured from Dec. 13, 1996, 
for the next six months following. Stocks of unrecognized companies (recognition rate below 
10%), market indices (at that time Dow 30 and Dax 30), mutual funds, chance portfolios and 
individuals’ investment choices served as benchmarks. Results, in short, were that the eight 
recognition portfolios performed better than their benchmarks in almost all tests. This, however, 
does not justify exultation. Although Borges et al. (1999) admit that their portfolios have been 
tested in a bull market where big companies in general perform well, the power of ignorance will 
not always lead to money-making investment decisions.  
When we have a closer look at the period Dec. 13, 1996, to June 13, 1997 (were the recognition 
portfolios were tested), we see that the 100 leading US stocks (S&P 100) performed better than 
the small caps of the S&P 600 stocks (fig. 14)25. The same was the case with the German stocks: 
Dax 30, containing the 30 biggest German companies on the stock exchange, did better than 
SDax26, which consists of 50 small-cap companies (fig. 15). Thus, in this period there happened 
“big-firm effects” (Borges et al. 1999: 71).  Had the recognition portfolios been tested in another 
period, there would have been totally different results, to the disadvantage of the recognition 
heuristic: The US stock market showed so-called small-firm effects27, for example, in the years 2004-
2007 (fig. 16), outperforming large-cap companies (and in case of the recognition heuristic: highly 
recognized ones) by far, as did the German stock market in the years 1990-1991 (fig. 17)28.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
25 Also see: http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/main/en/us/ (retrieved on 08/2010). 
26 Also see: http://www.finanzen.net/index/SDAX/Werte (retrieved on 08/2010). 
27 Also see: http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/smallfirmeffect.asp (retrieved on 08/2010). 
28 Source of indices: Thomson Reuters Datastream; fig. 14-17: own elaboration. 
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Fig 14: US Stock Market Dec. 1996 - June 1997.    
 
 
 
            
 
Fig 15: German Stock Market 1990-2010. 
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Fig 16: US Stock Market 2003-2007.    
 
 
         
                          
 
Fig 17: German Stock Market 1990-1991. 
 
 
Newell and Shanks (2003: 53ff) used a process-oriented approach to test if people actually select 
the Take-the-Best heuristic in environments in which it is predicted to work: In artificial stock-
market experiments, participants were confronted with two-alternative choices between the 
shares of two fictional companies. The shares were described by four binary cues with varying 
validities. Participants were thus expected to buy cues in order of their validities; costs of information 
were set high to discourage buying of unneeded information. However, Newell and Shanks 
(2003) discovered that Take-the-Best’s stopping rule was violated a significant number of times: 
participants continued the search (=bought more information) even if they already had a cue that 
discriminated between two alternatives. This behavior was described as ‘weight of evidence’ 
strategy: People are not always content to base their decision on one discriminatory cue, but 
rather search for additional information to become more confident in their choice.   
Small-firm effects 
Small-firm effects 
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In a similar experiment setting, Newell et al. (2003: 84ff) wanted to assess if people make use of a 
non-compensatory heuristic like Take-the-Best if the complexity of the share task was raised (by 
increasing the number of binary cues from four to six). Also in here, ABC’s assumptions were 
violated: despite the complex environment, a high number of participants were not making use of 
the fast and frugal heuristic. 
For Newell et al. (2003: 84) and Newell (2005: 13), Gigerenzer’s notion of the nature of the 
environment determining which heuristic will be used is a problematic one: if one cannot predict 
which heuristic will be used in which environment, however restricted it may be, a particular 
heuristic will be assessed afterwards, therefore rendering the fast and frugal approach irrefutable. 
Although the adaptive toolbox “may prove to be a fruitful impulse for behavior decision 
research”, there is a strong need for (further and more specific) empirical validation (Bröder 
2003: 622). 
 
6.7 Challenges Ahead: What remains to be answered 
 
The ABC research group admits that so far most of their attention has been paid to their 
heuristics’ performance in comparison to normative models of rationality. Still, there are many 
challenges and open questions that have to be focused on (see Gigerenzer/Todd/The ABC 
Research Group 1999: 362ff): 
 Could simple heuristics be used for tasks that do not demand quick problem solving such 
as planning? Or will more time for pondering automatically lead to the selection of 
compensatory heuristics? 
 Where can further proof for the decision-making functions of emotional and social 
processes be found and how can they be integrated as building blocks? 
 What performance criteria should be used to measure the utility of fast and frugal 
heuristics? 
 How does the mind know which heuristic to select for a particular decision problem? 
 
Another question to be attended to would be how people actually learn about cue validities. As 
Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1999: 92) speculate, this may be “genetically coded through 
evolution”, furthermore be learned through cultural transmission, or direct observation. Thus, 
there is much need for empirical research on this issue. 
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7. Negotiations  
 
So far the focus was mainly on the individual’s decision making behavior when there is no need 
to take someone else’s perspective into consideration. A negotiation situation, on the other hand, 
presents a very complex social happening that not only demands to deal with one’s own 
judgmental evaluations and choices but also to come to terms with the complexities of interactive 
behavior. This chapter wants to give an overview of judgmental heuristics in negotiations and 
their impact on the perception of negotiations. 
 
7.1 Characteristics of Negotiations 
 
Negotiation can be defined as a “formal, civilized [decision-making] process that occurs when 
parties are trying to find a mutually acceptable solution to a complex conflict” (Lewicki et al. 
19942: 1), and as a “form of interpersonal communication, which itself is a subset of the broader 
category of human perception and communication” (Lewicki/Saunders/Minton 20034: 147).  
Its main characteristics (Lewicki et al. 19942: 4, 24f) are the following: 
 
 Negotiation involves two or more parties – individuals, groups, organizations. It can 
therefore be seen as an interpersonal or intergroup process.  
 There exists a conflict of interest between the parties.  
 Interests do not have to be necessarily at opposite ends.  
 Parties normally negotiate voluntarily, as they hope to solve their conflict that way more 
successfully. 
 Negotiation takes place when there is no established set of procedures for resolving the 
conflict, or when the parties want to find an own solution to settle their dispute.  
 Modifications of opening statements as well as give-and-takes are expected to occur 
during the negotiation process.  
 Negotiation is furthermore characterized by interdependent relationships (i.e. both 
parties need each other to achieve their goals), which is the basis for social interaction. 
Deutsch (1962, 1973, in: Lewicki 19942: 25, op. cit.) makes the distinction between 
contrient interdependence (zero-sum or distributive negotiations, “I win, you lose”) and 
promotive interdependence (nonzero-sum or integrative negotiations, “Let’s expand the pie”).  
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Interdependent relationships are of dynamic nature: people adjust their behavior based 
on how they expect the other party to behave, and how the other party actually behaves. 
The negotiator can take an approach from his own perspective and only focus on the 
components that affect his own goals; for mutual problem-solving and gains, however, 
the other party’s perspective has to be taken into consideration as well (Lewicki et al. 
19942: 25, 31). 
 
One popular approach to managing conflict is the Dual Concerns Model as proposed by Pruitt 
and Rubin (1986, in: Lewicki 19942: 10, op. cit.): The two-dimensional framework  postulates that 
negotiators either show more concern for their own outcomes (x-axis, assertiveness dimension) or more 
concern for the other’s outcomes (y-axis, cooperativeness dimension). Depending on their respective 
concern, negotiators can pursue five major (pure-form) negotiation strategies:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 18: The Dual Concerns Model (adopted from Pruitt and Rubin 1986, see Lewicki 19942). 
 
 
Competing (also called contending or dominating) negotiators pursue their own goals strongly and 
show little concern for the other party’s desired outcomes. This strategy creates win-lose 
situations and is usually applied if quick-decision making is necessary and a good long-term 
relationship with the other party does not have to be considered.  
Accommodating (also called yielding or obliging) negotiators create win-lose situations as well, but 
to their own disadvantage: They go along with the other party’s wishes as the relationship is 
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considered more important than the substantive outcome. This strategy can be pursued if the 
negotiation relationship will extend over the current negotiation. Thus, in the long term, it can be 
regarded as more advisable to accept a suboptimal result as reciprocity (‘tit-for-tat’) is expected in 
future negotiations.  
Avoiding (also called inaction) (non-)negotiators neither show much concern for their own nor 
for the other one’s outcomes; they prefer to stay passive or withdraw from the negotiation table. 
This strategy is used, for example, if the party considers the issue too unimportant for 
negotiation. Another reason might refer to the availability of BATNAs (Best Alternative To a 
Negotiated Agreement, also see section 7.2): a strong BATNA possibly enables the negotiator to 
reach his desired outcomes without negotiating at all; a weak BATNA, on the other hand, may 
pressurize him to accept the negotiation outcome in any case.  
Collaborating (also called problem solving or integrating) as a negotiation strategy will be used if 
both the outcome and the relationship are important. This leads to a win-win situation for both 
parties. However, the difficulty in this approach lies in perceiving a situation as having integrative 
potential as well as the necessity to invest time and energy in creating solutions.  
Compromising is not considered a possible strategy by Pruitt and Rubin (1986), though other 
scholars (e.g., Thomas and Kilmann 197429) using versions of this model do believe so.  
Compromising presents a moderate effort to pursue one’s own outcomes as well as a moderate 
effort to let the other party attain some of his outcomes by making concessions. 
It is, indeed, important to bear in mind that these five strategies present pure forms; however, as 
most conflicts are neither purely competitive nor cooperative, approaches to negotiation will 
consist of mixed strategies (Lewicki 19942: 8ff, 115ff).  
 
To understand the nature of interdependence between negotiation parties is vital to optimally 
manage negotiations: Negotiators make judgments about the nature of interdependence in the 
negotiation situation; the way interdependent situations are perceived has a crucial impact on 
how negotiations will be approached (Lewicki 19942: 33f).  
 
 
 
                                            
29 See Thomas, Kenneth W./Kilmann, Ralf  H. (1974): Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Survey, Xicom, 
Tuxedo/NY.  
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7.2 An Outlook on Negotiation Analysis 
 
In the late 1970s, the cognitive revolution had a great influence on research in negotiation, 
moving it in the direction of behavioral decision research in the following decades. Prescriptive 
advice beforehand set its focus mainly on game theory, the mathematical analysis of what 
“ultrasmart, impeccably rational, superpeople should do in competitive, interactive situations” 
(Raiffa 1982: 21). Game theory assumes both parties to behave rationally; Raiffa’s (1982) 
‘asymmetrically prescriptive/descriptive’ approach, however, acknowledges the importance 
of developing realistic predictions of the opposite negotiator’s (probabilistic) behavior rather than 
assuming him to pursue purely game-theoretic rational strategies. Raiffa’s type of analysis is 
therefore prescriptive for the party receiving advice and descriptive from the point of view of the 
other party, assuming it to act in an intelligent and goal-seeking way (Raiffa 1982: 21f; 
Neale/Bazerman 1991: 17; Sebenius 1992: 20; Bazerman et al. 2000: 282).  
The basic features of negotiation analysis are the following:  
 
 The BATNA (Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement, Fisher/Ury 198130) is the 
alternative in case of negotiation impasse, thus providing a lower bound for the minimum 
requirements of a negotiated agreement. Any joint agreement of higher subjective worth 
will be preferred to the BATNA. The reservation point indicates where the negotiator is 
indifferent between impasse and agreement. Before entering negotiation, one’s own as 
well as the opponent’s BATNA should always be assessed, respectively estimated.  
 The interests of the parties – their real concerns – have to be separated from the parties’ 
positions (what they require of the other side).  
 All negotiations involve distributive as well as integrative aspects; rarely will an 
integrative strategy eliminate the distributive dimension of negotiation. Distributive 
negotiation is about how to divide a fixed amount of resources – one party’s achievement is 
at the direct expense of the other party. Walton and McKersie’s (1965)31 ‘bargaining zone 
concept’ organizes the distributive aspects of negotiation by combining the reservation 
points of each party. If there is a gap between the two negotiators’ reservation points, a 
negative contract zone will be created; if the two resistance points overlap, a positive one. 
                                            
30 See Fisher, Roger/Ury, William (1981): Getting to Yes, Houghton Mifflin, Boston. 
31 See Walton, Richard E./McKersie, Robert B. (1965): A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiation, McGraw-Hill, 
NY. 
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Negotiation analysis focuses on actions that can change perceptions of the zone of 
possible agreements, in order to foster more successful distributive outcomes.  
Integrative negotiation involves the creative search for additional sources to enlarge the pie 
and thus to conclude negotiations ‘Pareto-optimal’, i.e. where deviations from the 
agreement would make the parties worse off (Neale/Bazerman 1991: 21ff; 32; Sebenius 
1992: 21f). 
 
Behavioral decision research in the 1980s and 1990s focused on what Raiffa’s (1982) work left 
unanswered: how the negotiator’s behavior is prone to judgmental errors or biases, thus deviating 
from rationality as postulated by prescriptive theory.  
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8. Judgmental Heuristics in Negotiations 
 
Based on Tversky and Kahneman’s thorough research on judgment and cognitive processing 
(from the 1970s ongoing, also see chapter 5), Bazerman and Neale (1982, 1991, 1992) present a 
number of judgmental heuristics negotiators rely on to cope with the complex and uncertain 
environment inherent to decision situations but that nonetheless can hamper their performance. 
 
8.1       Framing 
 
In general, framing means to embed observed events – as they do not happen in isolation – in a 
context, so as to give them meaning. Or, more down-to-earth, framing is a guide to the “decision 
maker’s interpretation of what is going on” (Beach/Connolly 20052: 16; 23).  
Bazerman and Neale (1982: 54f) have adopted the famous case of Kahneman and Tversky’s 
(1979)32 prospect theory to show the impact of framing on the negotiation process and 
outcome: There is the imminent threat that a large car manufacturer has to close his three plants 
and dismiss 6000 employees. Two emergency plans exist: plan A will save one of three plants and 
2000 jobs, plan B has a 1/3 probability of saving three plants and all 6000 jobs, but a 2/3 
probability of saving no plants and no jobs.  
Reformulated, plan A (or C) will result in the loss of two of three plants and 4000 jobs, plan B (or 
D) has a 2/3 probability of resulting in the loss of all three plants and 6000 jobs, but has a 1/3 
probability of losing no plants and no jobs.  
As can be seen clearly, plan A and C as well as plan B and D are objectively the same, just 
presented in different ways. One would expect the ‘rational’ individual to select the combinations 
A-C or B-D. However, people tend to choose the certain outcome A and at the same time the 
risky outcome D. How come? 
According to Prospect Theory, individuals are risk-averse when confronted with potential 
gains and risk-seeking when confronted with potential losses (“losses loom larger”). For 
negotiations, this means that the way the negotiation issue is frame has an impact on the parties’ 
perception of risk and respective behavior: Risk-averse negotiators may be prone to accept any 
feasible offer due to their fear of loss; risk-seeking negotiators, on the other hand, are likely to 
protract the negotiation, waiting for possible future concessions. Furthermore, there tend to be 
                                            
32 See Kahneman, Daniel/Tversky, Amos (1979): An Analysis of Decision under Risk, Econometrica, Vol. 47, No. 2, 
pp. 263-292. 
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fewer concessions in negotiations that are negatively framed, as well as fewer agreements and a 
perception of the outcome as less fair than with positive frames (perceived gains). Although 
reality checks and detailed information might present remedies for framing effects, frames are 
often tied to deeply rooted beliefs and values beyond one’s awareness (Neale/Bazerman 1991: 
44; Bazerman/Neale 1992: 39; Lewicki/Saunders/Minton 20034: 155f).  
 
8.2        Anchoring and Adjustment 
 
People estimate values for uncertain objects or events by starting from an initial anchor that 
serves as a benchmark; subsequent adjustments – seen as gains or losses – are measured against 
the initial value that is based on the information at hand, may it be incomplete or faulty.    
Initial offers, for example, can be chosen as an anchor: Final agreements are under the influence 
of the initial offer more strongly than under concessions made by the other party. This can also 
lead to impasse as the perception of the (positive) zone of possible agreements might be 
distorted. Furthermore, especial attention has to be given to the starting point or initial offer: if 
an unacceptable anchor is provided, the other negotiating party should not yield by adjusting, 
thus rendering the anchor valid, but re-anchor the whole process anew.  
Also, intended goals or targets can serve as anchors; they can either impede or enhance 
performance: If the negotiator does not adjust expectations sufficiently, he might miss out on a 
possible agreement between his desired outcome and his reservation point by only focusing on 
the target that will not be attained (Neale/Bazerman 1991: 48ff; Bazerman/Neale 1992: 28f; 
Lewicki/Saunders/Minton 20034: 155).  
 
8.3        Availability 
 
According to Tversky and Kahneman (1974), an event whose instances are retrieved more easily 
will appear more frequent than an event of equal occurrence whose instances are recalled less 
easily. Thus, a negotiator’s subjective probability of an event is likely to be greater if memory 
associations with that event are predominantly vivid.     
The availability heuristic can lead to three application biases: First, the ease of retrievability 
might occur when some information is presented particularly colorful or in emotionally vivid 
ways, thus being retrieved more easily from memory. This leaves room for potential manipulation 
of the negotiation outcome through the control of information by the mode and amount of 
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presentation. Also, biases in frequency judgment can be attributed to the affective component 
with which remembered images have become tagged (Slovic et al. 2002: 414). Second, the 
accessibility of information also affects negotiation through the use of established search 
patterns. Biases can be due to the overreliance on the way in which events or facts are stored in 
memory. For example, if a group of sales, production, accounting and human resources 
executives were asked to identify the most important challenge facing their company, each of 
them would approach the problem in terms of his own functional area of know-how. Third, 
individuals are prone to detect causal patterns and associative bonds, therefore misjudging the 
probability of two events occurring together. This is due to illusory correlations (Hogarth 
19892: 40; Neale/Bazerman 1991: 50ff; Bazerman/Neale 1992: 44f).  
 
8.4       The Mythical Fixed-Pie  
 
Many negotiators wrongly assume that their own interests are diametrically opposed to the other 
party’s interests – one person’s gains are at the expense of the other one, which is a characteristic 
of the ‘fixed-pie’ distribution. This can also be attributed to the incompatibility bias33: the 
assumption that the parties do not have common interests (“What is good for them must be bad 
for us”). Most conflicts, however, are not of purely distributive nature but involve mixed-motive 
elements. Also, there is often more than one issue at stake, and each party places different values 
on them (Neale/Bazerman 1991: 64; Bazerman/Neale 1992: 16).   
Fixed-pie perceptions can partly be explained by our upbringing in a performance and 
achievement-oriented society that views most situations as competitive ones. This leads to a 
win-lose orientation about obtaining the largest share of the perceived fixed pie. Integrative 
agreements, on the other hand, are about adding resources to the available limited resources so 
that both parties can realize their objectives; integrative bargaining also involves logrolling, i.e. 
the trade-off of issues upon each party places different priorities (Neale/Bazerman 1991: 61f; 
Lewicki et al. 19942: 91) 
The fixation on a competitive approach is the most crucial barrier to creative problem-solving 
that integrative negotiations require for. In their ‘Nine Dots Problem’, Bazerman and Neale 
(1992: 18f) show that people often fail to solve problems due to their self-imposed assumptions 
about the respective problem. When asked to connect all nine dots with four straight lines, 
                                            
33 See Thompson, Leigh (1990): Information Exchange in Negotiation, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
Vol. 27, pp. 161-179. 
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people often do not push the boundaries of the square – a behavior that can be attributed to the 
desire to fit a problem into well-established expectations. To connect the dots, not a mythical 
fixed pie must be assumed (by making inappropriate assumptions about the opponent), but one’s 
eyes should be kept peeled for trade-offs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 19: The ‘Nine Dots Problem’: Creative Problem-Solving (see Bazerman/Neale 1992). 
 
 
Opportunities for joint gain can also be shown in the example of Follett (1940)34: Two sisters are 
haggling about how to divide an orange; of course, both demand the whole fruit. By exchanging 
information about what each of them needs, they could find out that one of them wants the peel 
for making a cake, and the other one the pulp for making orange juice.  
It is important, however, to bear in mind that a conflict-laden and competitive past relationship 
increases the likelihood of a defensive and win-lose approach to the current negotiation, thus to a 
failure of seeing feasible integrative potential (Lewicki et al. 19942: 106).   
In his experiments, De Dreu (2003) also came to the conclusion that (felt!) time pressure 
prevents the revision of fixed-pie perceptions, hence leading to lower mutual outcomes. De Dreu 
concludes that this could be due to the closing of the mind (see Kruglanski/Webster 1996), i.e. the 
freezing upon the status quo of perception and available knowledge. The closing of the mind 
supposedly reduces the motivation to encode new information about the other party’s 
preferences, so as to not disconfirm the prior judgment.   
 
8.5        The Irrational Escalation of Commitment 
 
Sometimes negotiators maintain commitment (and allocation of resources) to a failing course of 
action. Unbowed commitment should justify previous actions, even if the choice of doing so is 
                                            
34 See Follett, Mary Parker (1940): Constructive Conflict, in: Metcalf & Urwick (eds.): Dynamic Administration. The 
Collected Papers of Mary Parker Follett, Harper, NY, pp. 36-47. 
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no longer valid (“throwing good money after bad”). This behavior can be attributed to the 
concept of sunk costs: time and money already invested are taken into account when deciding 
for a future course of action, though resources invested cannot be recovered and thus should not 
be integrated into the decision process (Neale/Bazerman 1991: 66; Bazerman/Neale 1992: 10).  
Escalation of commitment is partly due to individual perception and judgment: First, an initial 
course of action will be pursued. Then, people are prone to get stuck in the confirmation trap – 
information that supports or confirms the earlier decision will be more salient than data that 
contradicts it. Thus, confirming information to the action taken is sought intuitively, while 
disconfirming evidence will be ignored either deliberately or unconsciously. Festinger (1957)35 
argues that this is endorsed by the need for cognitive balance, which requires that an individual 
cannot maintain inconsistencies in actual behavior and beliefs at the same time (Neale/Bazerman 
1991: 69; Bazerman/Neale 1992: 13).  
Finally, the desire to be consistent in a chosen course of action is often strengthened by the 
desire to save face and to maintain the impression of having hold of the reins.  Unilaterally 
giving up in a conflict seems like admitting defeat; escalation of commitment, on the other hand, 
leaves the future uncertain. This could be regarded as more desirable than accepting the certain 
loss of retreating (also see section 7.3.1 on framing effects: “losses loom larger”). If both 
negotiating parties hold this view, escalation of conflict is preprogrammed: Commitment to their 
respective positions will be enforced and the willingness to change to a different course of action 
(e.g., to a compromise) is diminished. Furthermore, announcement to the general public of one’s 
commitment increases the probability to escalate non-rationally (Bazerman/Neale 1982: 61; 
Neale/Bazerman 1991: 69f; Lewicki/Saunders/Minton 20034: 153).  
The dollar auction paradigm as introduced by Shubik (1971)36 is a well-known example for 
competitive irrationality: It occurs that many situations look like opportunities first, but then 
turn out to be traps because the probable behavior of the other party has not been taken into 
account.  In Shubik’s experiment, participants are asked to bid for a one-dollar bill; the auction 
will be finished until no further bidding occurs. The highest bidder will get the dollar bill and pay 
the amount he bid; the second highest bidder has to pay his bid as well, but will not receive 
anything in return. The potential gain and the possibility of winning the auction are reason 
enough to enter the game. However, when coming near the one-dollar boundary, the highest and 
the second highest bidder are trapped:  one bidder may have the feeling that one more bid will 
                                            
35 See Festinger, Leon (1957): A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, Row, Peterson, Evanston (Ill.). 
36 See Shubik, Martin (1971): The Dollar Auction Game. A Paradox in Non-Cooperative Behavior and Escalation, 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 15, pp. 109-111. 
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get the other one to exit the auction; the same reason applies to the other bidder. Yet, without 
knowing the bidding pattern of the opposite party, entering the game and making the initial bid 
cannot be classified as irrational behavior per se; a smart decision maker, however, takes the 
other decision maker’s probable behavior into consideration as well to finally not get caught in 
the trap (Neale/Bazerman 1991: 66f; Bazerman/Neale 1992: 11f; 15).  
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9. Discussion: A Critical Review of  ABC’s Heuristics in 
Comparison to the Heuristics and Biases Program and 
Their Suitability for Negotiations 
 
Coming to the right conclusion with only little information (=frugal), while at the same time 
using few mental resources (=fast) – indeed, ABC’s heuristics seem like an intriguing approach of 
how to interpret the world. But, as the saying goes, all that glitters is not gold, or: an appealing 
wrapping will not belie certain discrepancies and limitations, as I want to discuss as follows. 
 
The ABC research group (in particular Gerd Gigerenzer: e.g., see Gigerenzer 1996a) has been 
persistently criticizing Tversky and Kahneman’s work on human judgmental evaluations (from 
the 1970s ongoing) as a glass half-empty approach. This view has not been changed despite 
the fact that Tversky and Kahneman revised their earlier work, shifting it from a Bayesian 
reasoning and probability theory centered analysis to a more psychologically plausible approach – 
as can be seen in the Linda example that was formerly interpreted as violating extensional logic, 
but later regarded as context-sensitive understanding of causal conjunctions (see 
Tversky/Kahneman 2002).   
Much of the Heuristics and Biases Program is based on the assumption that human cognition has 
dual aspects, an outcome-oriented associative system that produces intuitive answers, and a 
process-oriented system that comprises abstract and deliberate thinking. The mode of operation 
is supposedly interactive; both systems respond to the respective problem, though their answers 
might not come to the same conclusion. System 2 is ascribed the monitoring, controlling and 
overriding role of System 1’s original proposal; judgmental biases in Tversky and Kahneman’s 
sense can thus be contributed to the intuitive judgments of System 1 and give raise to the 
question why the judgmental error was not corrected by System 2 (see Kahneman/Frederick 
2002 and Sloman 2002).  
Gigerenzer, on the other hand, condemns the dual-reasoning approach; for him, dividing 
reasoning into “good” and “bad” cognition endorses the homo œconomicus view of the rational 
decision maker that is supposed to behave to a norm’s prescription: “[…] The unquestioned 
assumption behind these theories is that the more laborious, computationally expensive, and 
nonheuristic the strategy, the better the judgments to which it gives rise. […] Consequently, it 
comes as a surprise to the dichotomy makers when people perform better by violating one of 
these ideological dictums, for instance when people make judgments by relying on their intuition 
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than when they reason (sic!) […]” (Gigerenzer/Todd 1999: 20f). This is a surprising statement 
insofar as ABC’s heuristics themselves are based on “higher order cognitive processes that call 
upon lower order processes of cue perception and memory [such as voice and face recognition]” 
(Gigerenzer/Todd 1999: 30). In other words, simple heuristics are based on dual-process models 
of cognition as well; only has System 1 been assigned the inferior part in the simple heuristics’ 
algorithmic procedure. Interestingly, Gigerenzer’s popular book ‘Gut Feelings – The Intelligence 
of the Unconscious’ (2007, Penguin Books) is about decision making by relying on intuition – an 
intrinsic feature of the associative “bad” cognition –, as is his favorite example for showing the 
fast and frugal heuristics’ approach: a baseball player, catching the ball by making use of the gaze 
heuristic. As the player certainly does not consciously choose to think with his gut, the focus will 
solely be on the outcome: the ball is caught. The discrepancy is obvious – if only the result can be 
seen, judgmental heuristics come into play; for better retracing the process, the conscious use of 
choice heuristics is more optimal.   
Apart from the confusing state of ABC’s heuristics being choice heuristics that mostly rely on the 
subconscious (as do Tversky and Kahneman’s judgmental heuristics), Gigerenzer likes to present 
his approach to human’s bounded rationality as innovative and a glass half-full one. Not only 
does he base simple heuristics on the abundantly available findings of Tversky and Kahneman 
(while nonetheless at the same time claiming to be more pro-human than the latter ones) –, two 
of his most used examples to show how we can do without the economic concept of reasoning 
are, in fact, someone else’s slightly altered illustrations: As already mentioned in section 4.1, the 
baseball player example has originally been made up by Friedman and Savage (1948), showing 
how a billiard player uses the angle of gaze for shooting in the right direction; Gigerenzer’s 
second-favorite example is the following, clearly based upon the (uncited) illustration of Thagard 
and Millgram (1997) (see section 3.1):  
 
“A decision theorist from Columbia University was struggling whether to accept an offer from a rival 
university or to stay. His colleague took him aside and said, “Just maximize your expected utility – 
you always write about doing this.” Exasperated, the decision theorist responded, “Come on, this is 
serious.” (Gigerenzer 2004: 62)  
 
 
 
According to the ABC research group, fast and frugal heuristics operate on inference from 
memory or inference from the environment (Gigerenzer/Todd 1999), as opposed to inference 
from givens. The latter one refers to experimental situations, in which all the information needed is 
directly given to the participants and no cognitive costs occur (hence, strategies for dealing with 
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the mind’s boundedness cannot be tested). The research group, though, does not act in unison 
when it comes to the inference approach: For Gigerenzer (1996a: 651), a person making use of 
Take-the-Best performs an inference based on knowledge retrieved from memory only, whereas 
Todd (2001: 54) states that cognitive energy is consumed when cues have to be found in the 
environment. This leads to the following conclusion: if the cues are part of the background 
knowledge of a person, integration of information might not be as restricted as postulated by the 
ABC research group and costs of retrieving information might not be high at all. Indeed, when it 
comes to common-sense knowledge parallel architecture of cognition can enable the integration 
of a vast amount of information (see Chater et al. 2003).    
A blend of inference from givens as well as inference from memory can be found in the 
experiments by Bröder and Schiffer (2003, for a revision see Newell 2005): Participants were 
expected to solve a murder; first, they loaded cues (or attributes) of the suspects into their 
memories. Then, cue validities were built by the number of witnesses agreeing on certain 
attributes. In the final phase, the potential murderer had to be found in a two-choice inference by 
retrieving the information about the suspects only from memory.  
The representation format of information was indeed playing a crucial role; Take-the-Best was 
selected more often as an inference strategy when presented in word lists rather than as images. 
This indicates that simple heuristics are based on System 2 (choice heuristics), with the only 
exception being the recognition heuristic – it relies on the associative system first and is adopted 
by the deliberate system in the next step. The proposition can be made that the list of attributes 
(words, evoking the deliberate system) is supposedly translated into ‘images’, thus stirring the 
associative system that actives associate information – a mental representation will be formed 
thereupon that combines given and memory-stored information (see Glöckner/Betsch 2008 for 
the neural network/connectionist view on cognitive processing, resp. Newell/Bröder 2008: 
198 for a discussion).  
Transferring these thoughts to the artificial crime decision-problem leaves room for the following 
hypothesis: Cue values were established by the number of witnesses consenting on certain 
attributes (e.g., does the breed of the accompanying dog have a higher value than the type of 
clothing of the suspect?); even though participants inferred by retrieving the established ranking 
of cues from their memories, the associative system cannot be deactivated. Therefore, the rise of a 
heuristic like representativeness will be inevitable. Stereotyping, a typical feature of this 
judgmental heuristic, tells the participant that a Doberman could be more likely the 
accompanying dog of a criminal than a dachshund. If the respective participant already made 
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close and bad contact with such a breed (and this particular memory got a negative somatic 
tagging), probability will be high that he classifies the Doberman as a potential murderer’s dogs, 
no matter if the cue value on the respective dog was low. Problems occur, if there is a negative 
attribute correlation; according to Bettman et al. (1993), this should lead to more extensive 
processing strategies. For example: A dachshund and a heavily tattooed, chunky man do not fit 
into the schema of the typical criminal. As ambiguity and uncertainty normally do not arise in 
intuitive judgments, System 2 – that enables us to think contrary thoughts about the same thing 
(see Kahneman 2003: 1454) – will probably take the leading role and start comparing and 
weighing different attributes (a feature of compensatory strategies, which should not come up if a 
simple heuristic is chosen).  
Furthermore, negative background moods – though literature proposes they may lead to a more 
careful processing of cues (see section 6.5) – , may also cause the need to seize on early or first 
information instantly and suppress information that is conflicting with one’s existing knowledge 
structures and schemata (see Kruglanski/Webster 1996 on the motivated closing of the mind).  
 
ABC’s heuristics are for the most part based on one-reason decision making. Simple heuristics 
like Take-the-Best work most efficiently in environments with an outstanding cue that speeds 
up the decision process; an often used example of the ABC research group for demonstrating the 
power of one-reason decision making is the following one, designed by Breiman et al. (1993): “A 
man is rushed to the hospital in the throes of a heart attack. The doctor needs to decide quickly 
whether the victim should be treated as a low-risk or a high-risk patient. […]…She or he must 
decide under time pressure using only the available cues, each of which is, at best, merely an 
uncertain predictor of the patient’s risk level […]”. (Breiman et al. 1993, in: Gigerenzer/Todd 
1999: 3, op. cit.).  
Breiman et al. (1993) designed a simple decision tree (fig. 20) to classify heart attack patients 
according to risk using only three available predictors:  
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Fig 20: Simple Decision Tree for Classifying Incoming Heart Attack Patients (see Gigerenzer/Todd 1999). 
 
 
The emergency doctor’s two-choice yes/no approach of decision reaching is a prime example for 
simple heuristics’ fast and frugal strategy; indeed, ABC’s heuristics are pervaded by the 
Darwinian view of do lunch or be lunch. To explain in greater detail: As already stated in Todd 
(2001: 53f), the key factors influencing cognitive evolution came from the external environment. 
Time and resources are limited, so there is great pressure on the organism to a) react quickly in 
dangerous predator-prey situations and b) predict fast which food is edible to have a higher rate 
of energy intake than the competitors, which also means being able to focus on reproduction 
sooner etc.   
Take-the-Best’s strategy of taking the best cue can be traced back to the Darwinian concept of 
competition and survival: Undeniably, the two-choice algorithm is do lunch or be lunch oriented. – It 
does not come as a surprise then that there are many comparisons to the animal kingdom in 
ABC’s research work, e.g. see Blythe/Todd/Miller 1999: A zebra has to predict quickly what a 
moving lion probably means for him:    
 better turn tail (he is heading straight for you, looking very hungry) or  
 continue grazing (the lion is just chasing the lioness, eager to mate and thus not 
interested in food at the moment). 
If ABC’s heuristics are regarded from the Darwinian angle (which the research group stresses, 
e.g. see Gigerenzer 2001a), quick decision making means survival (being not eaten) and 
competitive advantage (having enough to eat, respectively females to mate). Thus, simple 
heuristics are based on instinct and intuition; intuition in that sense can be understood as 
Is the minimum systolic blood pressure 
over the initial 24 hour period > 91? 
Is age > 62.5? 
Is sinus tachycardia present? 
High 
risk 
Low 
risk 
Low 
risk 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes
No 
No 
High 
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knowledge that has become integrated in the associative network (Sloman 2002). Speaking of 
humans again, the reference can also be made to Evans and Over’s (1997) personal rationality – 
how to keep oneself alive – which is relying on the unconscious System 1. Transferred to 
mankind’s world where we are chased only metaphorically by lions, judgmental heuristics tell us 
what to do in most situations; System 2 will check in case of validity concerns or if a comparison 
to a norm has to be made.  From this perspective, one of ABC’s questions concerning future 
research on simple heuristics can now be answered (see section 6.7): Could simple heuristics be used 
for tasks that do not demand quick problem solving such as planning? As a decision maker certainly does 
not plan his immediate survival but a good living instead (and this requires more in-depth 
thinking), simple heuristics are supposedly not applicable for the planning process.  
 
 
As the last point I critically want to examine the suitability of ABC’s heuristics for 
negotiations:  
In chapter 7, judgmental heuristics and their impact on the negotiation situation have been 
illuminated. Clearly, the question arises if fast and frugal heuristics could also be of use when the 
individual decision maker’s behavior is shifted from an intrapersonal to the interpersonal 
negotiation situation. 
Social context is a crucial part of negotiations; social happenings supposedly stir more emotions 
than intrapersonal decision-making. As negotiations are about solving a conflict (see the 
definition by Lewicki et al. 19942), it can be hypothesized that positive emotions are at a lower 
level. Recalling section 6.5 (The Influence of Emotions and Social Context), conflict means stress 
which in turn triggers negative emotions, thus leading to an affective judgment that is charged 
more strongly; the evaluation of the situation is done by the associative system. This can result, 
inter alia, in  
- avoidance behavior (feign death) 
- panic (flight), possibly leading to some headless decision or 
- aggressive behavior (fight). 
The terms in brackets are supposed to refer to the Darwinian concept of do lunch or be lunch as 
described above. Bridging these thoughts with the Dual Concerns Model by Pruitt and Rubin 
(1986), fight presents the competing strategy where the concern about the own outcome is high, 
as opposed to the little concern shown for the other one’s outcome. If fast and frugal heuristics 
are thus seen from the Darwinian angle – just recall that one of the reasons for exposing 
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competitive behavior is that quick decision making is required –, ABC’s one-reason decision-
making heuristics will yield distributive negotiation behavior; the famous “I win, you lose” 
situation consequently occurs (hereby not coming as a surprise: if the lion catches the zebra, he 
wins and the zebra loses, unfortunately being trapped in a zero-sum game). 
But could mutual problem-solving be possible if fast and frugal heuristics are applied? – The research 
on social context’s influence on simple heuristics regrettably is advanced in the animal kingdom 
only (done by observations, see Gigerenzer/Todd/The ABC Research Group 1999); there is 
hardly any empirical validation for human social processes. – Nonetheless, they are claimed to be 
important for the building blocks of simple heuristics. (Ironically, integration, as required by the 
problem-solving approach, is not a term favored by the ABC research group, either.) 
In my understanding, social context (especially in face-to-face negotiations) will always raise the 
associative system first, though the deliberate system may override the initial judgmental – 
particularly, if there is much at stake (Did I really consider and integrate every detail? – compensatory 
strategies) or in case of accountability. Albeit System 2 can ‘correct’ System 1 (that eagerly strives 
for schemata, availability, anchors and projection – cases of perceptual distortion), the associative 
evaluation cannot be suppressed, subsequently leading to possible thoughts like: My choice does not 
feel right, even though it should be regarded as reasonable. Seen as such, the use of electronic tools in 
negotiations may probably reduce the raise of judgmental heuristics, as evident social context is 
reduced, and hence activate the deliberate system more strongly – which favors the use of choice 
heuristics as ABC’s fast and frugal ones.   
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11.  Appendix 
             Abstract (English) 
 
Decision-making is an integral part of our lives. For decades, human beings were regarded as 
complete rational decision makers, prescribed to behave to the norms and axioms of 
mathematics and economics. However, for making decisions in consistence with these models 
humans do possess neither the knowledge and time nor the required computational capacities; as 
coined by Herbert Simon, their rationality is bounded. Instead, judgmental evaluations and 
choices are made by the use of cognitive heuristics, colloquially called ‘mental short-cuts’. 
According to the state-of-the-art literature, cognitive heuristics can be divided into judgmental 
and choice heuristics. Judgmental heuristics are covered in the Heuristics and Biases Program as 
introduced by Tversky and Kahneman; the ‘fast and frugal’ approach of the ABC research group 
of the Max Planck Institute for Human Development deals with choice heuristics for the most 
part – conscious and adaptive strategies, intentionally designed to simplify choice. The purpose 
of this thesis is to examine how these heuristics influence the individual’s decision process, as 
well as to study their impact on the interpersonal negotiation situation.     
            Abstract (German)  
 
Entscheidungen zu treffen ist ein zentraler Bestandteil unseres Lebens. Während für lange Zeit 
die präskriptive Entscheidungstheorie das Bild des Nutzen maximierenden und rational 
agierenden homo œconomicus geprägt hat, zeichnete Herbert Simon ein differenziertes Bild:  
Menschen handeln aufgrund begrenzter kognitiver Fähigkeiten und Zeit sowie begrenztem 
Wissen eingeschränkt rational. Die Urteils- und Entscheidungsfindung unter Unsicherheit wird 
stattdessen durch die Anwendung kognitiver Heuristiken (‚Daumenregeln’) getroffen; diese 
können nach dem aktuellen Stand der Literatur unterteilt werden in Urteils- und Wahlheuristiken. 
Das ‚heuristics and biases’ Programm von Tversky und Kahneman beschäftigt sich mit intuitiven 
Denkprozessen (Urteilsheuristiken); die ABC Forschungsgruppe des Max-Planck-Instituts für 
Bildungsforschung untersucht vor allem den Einsatz bewusst gewählter, adaptiver 
Wahlheuristiken. Die Zielsetzung der vorliegenden Arbeit ist es, den Einfluss dieser kognitiven 
Heuristiken auf den Entscheidungsprozess des Einzelnen zu beleuchten, sowie den Bogen zu 
spannen zu deren Bedeutung für die interpersonelle Konfliktsituation in Verhandlungen.   
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